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IF YOU GRANT IT, THEY WILL COME: THE HISTORY AND
ENDURING LEGAL LEGACY OF MIGRATORY DIVORCE

Michael J. Higdon*
ABSTRACT

Fifty years ago, California became the first state to enact no-fault
divorce, making it easier than ever before for individuals to dissolve
unsuccessful marriages. Soon every state would follow suit, and over the
years much has been written about this national shift in the law of
divorce. What has thus far escaped scrutiny, however, is one of the prime
casualties of that switch—the phenomenon of migratory divorce. That
failure is somewhat ironic given that, although no-fault divorce has
existed for just over fifty years, migratory divorce played a prominent
role in American legal history for well over a hundred years. Migratory
divorce is the process through which people who lived in states where a
divorce was difficult to obtain would temporarily relocate to another
state—one with more liberal divorce laws—in order to satisfy that state’s
domicil so as to obtain a divorce there. Divorce in hand, that person
typically returned home to continue life as an unmarried person. Many
states, however, opposed recognizing such divorces, giving rise to
multiple Supreme Court opinions dealing with when a state is
constitutionally required to recognize such a decree. Contemporaneous
with that debate, a large number of Americans fiercely opposed the
practice of migratory divorce altogether, fearing the impact it would have
on the sanctity of marriage. As a result, there were a number of proposals
over the years for dealing with this “problem,” primarily involving
constitutional amendments and uniform laws. In light of this history, it
is the position of this Article that the era of migratory divorce offers an
invaluable resource for those studying not only the development, but also
the continuing evolution of the American family law. Accordingly, this
Article chronicles that legal phenomenon, offering detailed analysis of
the various social, legal, and political influences that ultimately shaped
this unique time in American history. The purpose in doing so is, first, to
ensure that this fascinating period in American history is not forgotten,
but more importantly, to distill the legal lessons produced by this era—
lessons that are highly instructive to contemporary scholars, courts, and
policy makers alike as they continue to wrestle with the emerging
problems facing the law of domestic relations.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee College of Law.
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1

“[T]he States whose laws were the most lax as to length of residence
required for domicile, as to causes for divorce, and to speed of procedure
concerning divorce, would in effect dominate all the other States.” –

Haddock v. Haddock2
I. INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1955, James Sumner observed that “[t]he recognition of
divorce decrees has perhaps created more concern in the United States
than any other legal issue.”3 Today, such questions have largely been
settled and, thus, the law of domestic relations is now consumed with
other, more pressing issues like—to name a few—determining legal
parentage in the face of evolving technology and societal mores,4 the
extent to which cohabitants should be afforded marriage-like
protections,5 and how in the wake of Obergefell states are to achieve true
marriage equality.6 Nonetheless, bearing in mind philosopher George
Santayana’s admonition that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are
1 During its heyday as divorce destination, Reno actively promoted its divorce
industry. One way they did so was by selling postcards that Reno’s divorce tourists could
send home to friends and family. Pictured is one such postcard from circa 1942, featuring
a drawing by cartoonist Lee Hymers.
2 201 U.S. 562 (1906)
3 James D. Sumner, Jr., Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees—Present Doctrine
and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1955).
4 See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
6 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption PostObergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 664 (2016); Lee-ford Tritt, The Stranger-to-theMarriage Doctrine: Judicial Construction Issues Post-Obergefell, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 373,
374 (2019).
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condemned to repeat it.”7 the question arises as to whether those
grappling with these contemporary issues might benefit from revisiting
earlier periods in American law—specifically the one to which Sumner
was referring. After all, as discussed later, the legal issues posed by those
events generated a considerable paper trail including numerous
Supreme Court opinions that span more than seventy years8 as well as
numerous proposals for uniform state laws and even constitutional
amendments.9 It is the position of this Article that the evolving law of
domestic relations would indeed benefit from a look back, not only to the
issue of divorce recognition but the fascinating historical events that
made that question such a hot button issue in the first place.
Essentially, it would all begin in 1861 when the territory of Nevada
adopted a law that, although on its surface was quite innocuous, would
eventually cause people the world over to associate Reno, Nevada, with
“quickie” divorces. The law in question set the territory’s residency
requirement at six months.10 Nevada did so in light of the fact that it
had many new residents at that time—most of them miners—pouring in
to the territory, and the territory wanted to make sure that these new
arrivals did not have to wait too long before being able to vote in
territorial elections.11 Of course, by obtaining residency those individuals
also gained access to a whole host of state rights, including most notably
the right to petition for divorce—an opportunity that would soon catch
the eyes of some who lived outside the state.
To understand why, one must first realize that throughout the
nineteenth century public attitudes towards divorce were changing, with
fewer people thinking of marriage as a legal status that could only
terminate upon the death of one of the spouses.12 The laws, however,
7 GEORGE SANTAYANA & MARIANNE S. WOKECK, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF
HUMAN PROGRESS: INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON SENSE, Volume VII, Book One
172 (2011).
8 See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Part III.B.
10 See ALICIA BARBER, RENO’S BIG GAMBLE: IMAGE AND REPUTATION IN THE BIGGEST
LITTLE CITY 54 (2008) (referencing the “1861 law that provided for the conferral of Nevada
territorial (and later, state) residency after just six months of continuous residence”).
11 See Id. at 54 (describing the motivation behind the law as “hasten[ing] the ability
of transient miners and other new arrivals to vote in territorial and, later, state
elections”); see also NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (1962) (explaining how mining territories passed laws of this
sort in light of “the necessary mobility of frontier towns, where prospectors and other
adventurers move, try their luck, and often roll on again without staying more a year in
any locality. If such communities were to have voters, they had to specify periods of
residence in terms of months rather than years”).
12 See A. Rachel Camp, Pursuing Accountability for Perpetrators of Intimate Partner
Violence: The Peril (and Utility?) of Shame, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1677, 1703 (2018) (noting
that “[d]ivorce became more accepted in the late 19th century”); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN &
LAWRENCE W. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY
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were not necessarily following suit,13 and a number of Americans found
themselves desiring a divorce, yet living in states where they could not
obtain one.14 Not all states, however, were that restrictive,15 and as a
result those who lived in stricter states started to realize that other
forums might offer some relief. Some states became particularly
attractive. Specifically, those that 1) maintained short residency
requirements and 2) permitted divorce on more liberal grounds16 were
seen by many as being well worth the expense of a temporary relocation.
And where individuals saw a path to divorce, states saw a path to
tremendous revenue. During the peak of migratory divorce in the midtwentieth century, for instance, Nevada realized revenues of several
million dollars a year.17 For that reason, over the next hundred years,
various states would come to be characterized as “divorce mills,”18 each
competing for the lucrative migratory divorce trade until, that is, the
entire practice began to die out—largely due to the advent of no-fault
divorce—in the late 1960s.19
Since that time, migratory divorce has come to be regarded as largely
a historical relic, one that today receives relatively little attention by
legal scholars.20 Even among the scholars who make reference to this
AMERICA 163 (2011) (“Changing ideology, changing culture, and changing gender roles
increased the demand for divorce.”) (emphasis in original).
13 See Sumner, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that the rise of migratory divorce
“indicates that the law has not kept abreast of the times”); see also infra note 31 and
accompanying text.
14 Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 447,
455–56 (2011) (“Some states banned divorces outright, and, of those that granted
divorces, the more strict states, such as New York, permitted divorce only in cases of
adultery.”).
15 See infra Part II.B.
16 At this point in history, no-fault divorce did not yet exist, and a person desiring a
divorce was required to prove that his or her spouse had somehow breached the marital
contract. See infra notes 59 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Neil Ribner & Jason Ribner, United States: 1901 to 1950, in CULTURAL
SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1244, 1247 (Robert E. Emory ed., 2013) (using
the term “divorce mills” and defining it as “cities in liberal states that offered divorce like
it was another tourist attraction”).
19 See Helen Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault
Era, 58 TEX. L. REV. 501, 523–24 (1980) (“The widespread acceptance of no-fault divorce
has also diminished substantially the importance of another evil the present rules were
designed to combat—migratory divorce.”); see also Developments in the Law: The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1245 (1980) (“With the widespread
adoption of no-fault divorce laws in recent years, however, the frequency of such
migratory divorces has greatly diminished, and such interstate jurisdictional squabbles
have become rare.”).
20 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 399, 479 (1990) (“[N]o-fault schemes now provide a common
denominator among the jurisdictions, and one hears little about migratory divorce
resulting solely from efforts to evade the law of the domicile.”); Jeanne Louise Carriere,
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period in American law,21 none has chronicled the rich history behind the
phenomenon of migratory divorce, nor has any delved into the complex
social, legal, and political influences that would coalesce to shape this
unique period in American family law. And this failure is problematic for
two reasons. First, it is a truly captivating period in American legal
history, one that boasts an elaborate and colorful complexity with which
many are unfortunately unacquainted. Second, and most importantly, a
number of contemporary legal problems facing the law of domestic
relations either owe their existence to the various legal dilemmas that
emerged as a result of migratory divorce or, even if not directly arising
from that practice, could nonetheless be better analyzed by harnessing
the lessons offered by that period in history.22 And these contemporary
problems are far from being discrete issues of limited import but instead
include such pervasive issues as the evolution of divorce as an individual
right, the harms that flow from family law’s failure to adapt to changing
societal norms, the value derived from uniform codes pertaining to the
family, and the limitations imposed on states by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.23 For all those reasons,
the era of migratory divorce deserves renewed attention.
The aim of this Article then is two-fold: first, to chronicle the timeline
of events comprising this period in American legal history and, second,
to analyze the impact that history has played—and continues to play—
in the development of the law of domestic relations in the United States.
In so doing, this Article is the first to offer a detailed exploration of the
various historical events that contributed to the prolific, brazen forum
shopping that has come to characterize this legal era.24 For instance, this
Article chronicles not only the competition that unfolded among the
"It's Deja Vu All over Again": The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception
and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1731 (1998) (“The relative uniformity of current

divorce law has made migratory divorce an irrelevancy.”).
21 See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501
(2008); Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage
and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87
(2004); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the
Western Legal Tradition, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 407 (2004); Kimberly Diane White, Covenant
Marriage: An Unnecessary Second Attempt at Fault-Based Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869,
882 (2010).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 U.S. CONST., art. IV § 1.
24 Michael Boucai, Before Loving: The Lost Origins of the Right to Marry, 2020 UTAH
L. REV. 69, 137 (2020) (describing migratory divorce as “a species of forum shopping that
pitted jurisdictions with more restrictive divorce laws against those with less restrictive
rules”); Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making A Case
for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1245 (1993) (“Migratory divorce is
a species of forum shopping.”).
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states in the race to attract out-of-state divorce business,25 but the strict
divorce laws that made migratory divorce such an attractive option in the
first place.26 Likewise included are contemporaneous reactions to this
phenomenon, most of which were quite critical, and the texts of various
laws and Constitutional amendments that were proposed to bring
migratory divorce to an end.27 Finally, this Article includes an analysis
of the twelve decisions by the Supreme Court—decisions that spanned a
period of more than seventy years—dealing with the constitutional
implications of such divorces.28
In order to both accomplish these goals and to delineate the various
historical elements, this Article is organized in four parts. Part II begins
with a discussion of divorce laws as they existed at America’s founding
up until the mid-nineteenth century when couples began seizing upon
migratory divorce as a solution to dissolving unsuccessful marriages.
Part II then chronicles the various states that attracted those divorce
seekers—some unintentionally, some purposefully—explaining why
Nevada ultimately emerged as the most successful. Part III turns to the
legal reactions to migratory divorce. It begins by discussing the long list
of Supreme Court cases that wrestled with the issue of when states were
required, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to give effect to
migratory divorces before then turning to the various legal proposals
aimed at ending the practice. Finally, Part IV traces the impact of all this
history on several contemporary issues within the field of family law,
noting the degree to which migratory divorce is relevant to the
development of each. Part IV next argues how understanding the
relationship between these contemporary issues and migratory divorce is
crucial to courts, policy makers, and scholars alike, enabling them to
more effectively analyze these issues going forward.
II. HISTORY OF MIGRATORY DIVORCE
Migratory divorce has been defined as “a divorce granted to a person
who has left his home in one state and resorted temporarily to another
state for the express purpose of obtaining a divorce from its courts.”29 The
practice has existed in some form or another since the country’s founding,
owing its emergence to the confluence of a number of legal and social
movements. However, as the country expanded westward and Americans
became more mobile, the practice grew exponentially.30 This rise in
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
27 See infra Part III.B.
28 See infra Part III.A.
29 David F. Cavers, Migratory Divorce, 16 SOCIAL FORCES 96, 97 (1937).
30 See infra Part II.B.
25
26
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migratory divorce was driven primarily by the growing demand for
divorce and the failure of some states to be responsive to that demand.
As one Nevadan would answer when asked how his state could justify
granting a divorce after only six weeks residence, which was to the be the
shortest residency requirement any state would adopt: “You can’t change
human nature by law. So what we’re trying to do is to make human
nature legal.”31
Nevada is, of course, the state most often associated with migratory
divorce. However, it was not until 1931 that Nevada lowered its residency
requirement to six weeks.32 By that time, several decades of competition
among the states to attract out-of-state divorce seekers had already
passed.33 Further, that competition would play on long after Nevada
made that bold move. The purpose of this section then is to go beyond
Nevada and chronicle the broader history of migratory divorce in the
United States, from how it owes its origins to the earliest divorce laws of
the American colonies, to the various states that jockeyed for the revenue
generated by these “divorce tourists,”34 and finally to how it all
unceremoniously ended in the late 1960s with the advent no-fault
divorce.

A. Early Divorce Laws
The controversy that inevitably surrounds divorce has been shaping
the law of domestic relations in the United States longer than the country
even officially existed.35 As Judith Areen describes, “[t]he roots of
American family law were planted nearly four centuries ago when new
England Puritans adopted both civil marriage and divorce in clear
violation of the laws of the Church of England.”36 When English settlers
first arrived in what would eventually become the United States, the
Church of England “continued to adhere to the doctrine of
indissolubility.”37 That is not to say that people in England could not
31 William G. Shepherd, Making Human Nature Legal, COLLIER’S: THE NATIONAL
WEEKLY, June 20, 1931, at 14.
32 See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
33 See RODRICK PHILLIPS, UNTYING THE KNOT: A SHORT HISTORY OF DIVORCE 160 (1991)
(“The distinction of being the most popular divorce haven was shared by several
midwestern and western divorce states at different times.”).
34 See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 168-69 (“Today we have eco-tourism,
and sex tourism; in the past there was a flourishing business of divorce tourism.”).
35 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234,
237–38 (D. Mass. 2010), aff'd, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that “[s]everal issues
relevant to the formation and dissolution of marriages have served historically as the
subject of controversy”).
36 Judith Areen, Uncovering the Reformation Roots of American Marriage and
Divorce Law, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 83 (2014).
37 MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 31 (1972).
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obtain a divorce—they could, but it took (quite literally) an act of
Parliament: “The only possibility of remarriage before the death of the
spouse of a prior marriage consisted of the grant of a special privilege by
the king in Parliament.”38
Early American settlers, however, brought with them the influence
of protestant reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin, both of
whom believed that “marriage and divorce were civil concerns.”39
Incorporating those principles, the Massachusetts Bay Colony began
granting divorces as early as 1639.40 Although the Puritans certainly did
not encourage divorce, they nonetheless “feared that forcing all estranged
couples to remain harnessed by law would eventually undermine the
social harmony they were trying to achieve.”41 Other New England
colonies soon followed suit, with Connecticut granting its first divorce in
1655.42 In fact, the colony of New Haven, which would eventually become
part of the Connecticut colony, was the first to adopt legislation listing
the grounds for divorce—those grounds being “adultery, desertion, and
male impotence, or, in the tactful words of the legislators, a husband’s
failure to perform his ‘conjugall duty’ to his wife.”43 The remaining New
England colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire likewise granted
divorces during the colonial period.44
Not all colonies embraced the idea of divorce as a civil remedy.45 The
southern colonies in particular were quite hostile to the idea and
38 Id.; see also GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 13 (1991)
(noting that, under “English policy, established in the Act of 1534, that only the
legislature—Parliament—could grant an absolute divorce”).
39 RILEY, supra note 38, at 11 (“Before migrating to the colonies in 1620, many
separatists embraced Martin Luther’s and John Calvin’s belief that marriage and divorce
were civil concerns.”). For an excellent discussion of what Luther and Calvin had to say
on the subject. See Areen, supra note 36.
40 See Lynda Wray Black, The Long-Arm's Inappropriate Embrace, 91 St. John's L.
Rev. 1, 19 n. 139 (2017) (“The first divorce in the United States was granted in
Massachusetts Bay in 1639 to Mrs. James Luxford on the grounds of bigamy.”).
41 See also RILEY, supra note 36, at 10. The Puritans acceptance of divorce also sprung
from the fact that they celebrated sex inside of marriage. See Areen, supra note 36, at 70
(noting that the divorce was seen as “the best way to prevent an innocent spouse in a
failed marriage from being forced to remain celibate for life”).
42 See CHRISTINA KASSABIAN SCHAEFER, THE HIDDEN HALF OF THE FAMILY: A
SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN'S GENEALOGY 75 (1999) (noting that the first Connecticut
divorce is granted “for three years’ desertion, seven years’ absence without word, cruelty,
fraudulent contract, and adultery”).
43 RILEY, supra note 36, at 19.
44 Colonial law in Rhode Island provided “that in case of adulterie, a generall or towne
magistrate may grant a bill of divorce against ye partie offendinge uppon ye demand of
ye partie offended,” whereas New Hampshire “followed the lead of neighboring
Massachusetts.” BLAKE supra note 11 at 39-40.
45 RILEY, supra note 36, at 34 (“During this period, each region of the new nation—
the South, Northeast, and West—embraced divorce with varying degrees of
enthusiasm.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757669

10

Migratory Divorce

continued to adhere to “English thinking regarding divorce.”46 The
reason the different colonies took such disparate approaches to divorce
stems, not from geography, but primarily from the different religious
denominations of early settlers.47 As one author describes, “[t]hroughout
the colonial period, the cultural and religious affiliations of colonies often
served as the determining factor in establishing the extent to which an
individual had access to the institution of divorce.”48 For instance, as
Glenda Riley explains: “When the first Virginians arrived at Jamestown
in 1607, they adhered to Anglican beliefs more closely than did the
Puritans and thus transplanted English policy prohibiting divorce.”49
Religion likewise played a role in the middle colonies, which took a more
“scattered”50 approach given that “these settlements drew their
population and their customs from a variety of sources.”51 Pennsylvania,
for example, was a Quaker colony and, thus, “tended to restrain the
granting of divorces,”52 even though it did at one point employ divorce as
a punishment for those who committed adultery.53 New Jersey, on the
other hand, which was “[s]ettled by a great variety of colonists, some of
whom like the Dutch and the Puritans looked upon marriage as a
dissoluble civil contract,”54 took a rather liberal approach, even granting
divorces by mutual consent at one point.55 The role that religion would
play in early divorce law is notable because it would eventually set the
stage for the growing demand for migratory divorce as well as the
inability of the states to agree on a solution to that “problem.”56
Following the American Revolution, the newly formed states not only
46 Id. at 26; see also Ayelet Hoffmann Libson, Not My Fault: Morality and Divorce
Law in the Liberal State, 93 TUL. L. REV. 599, 603 (2019) (“In America, the southern

colonies generally followed the English tradition.”).
47 See MARY SOMMERVILLE JONES, AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHANGING
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1987) (“The reason for this regional variation is
to be found in the religious antecedents of the settlers.”).
48 Deborah L. Bauer, Colonial America, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 18, at 288, 289.
49 RILEY, supra note 36, at 25.
50 Id. at 23.
51 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 41; see also CLARE A. LYONS, SEX AMONG THE RABBLE: AN
INTIMATE HISTORY OF GENDER AND POWER IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, PHILADELPHIA, 17301830 35 (2006) (“Colonial Pennsylvania’s marriage law allowed the colony’s diverse
cultural groups to follow their own traditions.”).
52 C. LaRue Munson & William D. Crocker, The Divorce Question in the United
States, 18 YALE L.J. 387, 388 (1909).
53 The law in Pennsylvania provided, as one of the punishments for adultery: “And
both he and the woman shall be liable to a Bill of Divorcement, if required by the grieved
husband or wife, within the said term of one year after Conviction.” BLAKE, supra note
11, at 45.

Id.
Id.
56 See infra notes 321-322 and accompanying text.
54
55
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threw off the shackle of English rule but, along with it, the previous
limitations regarding marital dissolution.57 Divorce soon became widely
available throughout the United States, with even the southern states
coming on board.58 It is important to note, however, that the practice of
divorce at this time was a far cry from how it operates today. To begin
with, it was fault-based, meaning that to obtain a divorce an aggrieved
spouse would have to “prove that the other spouse had violated the
martial contract in some severe way”59 and, at this point in history, those
grounds were quite limited.60 Perhaps the biggest difference, however,
lies in the fact that, although a state might permit divorce, the courts in
that state often lacked jurisdiction to grant them. Instead, in some states
it was the state legislature—similar to the role Parliament played in
England—that was responsible for dissolving marriages.61
Known as legislative divorce, this practice required aggrieved
spouses to petition the legislature for “private bills granting a divorce to
a single couple, who, in the opinion of the legislators, deserved one.”62
Maryland, for instance, passed over 500 divorce acts between the years
of 1790 and 1850.63 In some states, like Virginia, only the legislature
could grant an absolute divorce.64 In others, like Georgia, the legislature
57 See J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s Divorce Reform at the
Crossroads, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (1992) (“After the American Revolution, most

states quickly accepted the idea of absolute divorce.”).
58 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 34-35 (“Southern legislatures, except South Carolina,
made a radical change in their divorce policy after the American Revolution; although
they had opposed absolute divorce during the colonial period.”).
59 Ribner & Ribner, supra note 18, at 1245. As Lawrence Friedman explains: “A
divorce action was, in form, an adversary lawsuit. The plaintiff came before the court as
an innocent victim arguing that the defendant, husband or wife, had broken the marriage
contract. State statutes contained lists of bad deeds that constituted ‘grounds’ for
divorce.” Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2000).
60 See Ribner & Ribner, supra note 18, at 1245 (explaining that grounds typically
involved “abuse, infidelity, or extreme cruelty”); see also Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives
and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 651, 665 (2002) (“At the beginning of the nineteenth century, even the most liberal
of divorce laws allowed divorce only on very limited fault grounds.”); see also JONES, supra
note 47, at 19-24 (delineating the various grounds for divorce in the states following the
American Revolution).
61 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26
HARV. L. REV. 302 (1913) (“Legislative divorces were granted in New York after the
Revolution and were known in Connecticut, Maryland, and Rhode Island in the
nineteenth century.”); RILEY, supra note 36, at 35 (“After the Revolution, southern
legislatures replicated this [Parliamentary] practice by granting legislative divorces to
southern men and women.”).
62 Joanna L. Grossman, Separated Spouses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1645 (2001)
(emphasis added).
63 RICHARD H. CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 1 (1994).
64 See Areen, supra note 36 at 82 (“In 1803, the Commonwealth of Virginia first began
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authorized a “two-stage procedure”65 that involved both the judiciary and
the legislature.66 The reason for the legislatures’ reluctance to completely
divest themselves of this authority was the concern that some citizens
who might be “deserving” of a divorce would nonetheless be unable to
satisfy the limited statutory grounds for obtaining one.67 However, given
that legislative divorce “was a time-consuming process and one for which
the ordinary legislative committee was poorly equipped,”68 the states oneby-one began to end the practice, many by constitutional amendment.69
In most states the practice ended prior to the Civil War, typically
following legislation that expanded the grounds for obtaining a judicial
divorce.70
Even with the eventual move to judicial divorce in all states, different
jurisdictions required different grounds for dissolving a marriage.71 Not
surprisingly, some states were more liberal than others,72 and some made
it extremely difficult indeed to escape an unhappy marriage. South
Carolina was the strictest, refusing to allow divorce of any kind until
1949.73 Next was New York, which from 1787 until 1968 only permitted
to grant divorces, but only by legislative act.”). It is worth noting, however, that Virginia
began permitting its citizens divorce largely due to “[s]lavery and racism rather than
religion led.” Id. Indeed, the first two divorces granted in Virginia were to husbands
whose wives had given birth to biracial children, admitting that they had sexual relations
with a slave. As Areen explains, “[w]hatever the strength of the opposition to divorce in
Anglican Virginia, it was no match for the reaction of the legislature when confronted
with a marriage that involved not only adultery by a wife, but adultery with a slave.” Id.
65 PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 144.
66 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 52-53 (discussing how Georgia’s 1798 constitution
“permitted two-thirds of each bench of the legislature to pass acts of divorce, but specified
that this might be done only after the parties had had a fair trial before the superior
court”).
67 Blake provides two such examples.
First, he describes how “the Kentucky
legislature continued to pass private divorce bills, usually to accommodate individuals
whose cases did not come clearly under the regular statute.” Id. at 54. Missouri did
likewise, motivated by concerns “that the ordinary law did not provide for many cases of
real hardship.” Id. at 56.
68 Id. at 55.
69 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 36 (describing how gradually “constitutional
provisions and amendments [brought] a halt to legislative divorce”).
70 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 56-57 (“In most states the granting of legislative
divorce was halted sometime before the Civil War [and] was hastened by more liberal
general statutes.”).
71 See Cahn, supra note 60, at 665 (“By the end of the [nineteenth] century, states
had experimented with various different, and more liberal, grounds for permitting
divorce.”).
72 Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1690 (2011) (noting that “[t]he Midwestern and
Western states tended to adopt more liberal standards”).
73 See James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 917 (2000)
(“With the exception of ten years during the Reconstruction Era, South Carolina courts
allowed no divorces until 1949.”).
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one ground for divorce: adultery.74 For couples living in those states, it
was only a matter of time before they realized there was another avenue
available to those who truly wished to terminate a marriage.

B. The Rise of the “Divorce Mills”
Although Reno, Nevada would eventually become known as the
“Divorce Capital of the Nation,”75 divorce mills (as they came to be called)
actually started in the east and, over time, existed in some form in over
a dozen states. The states of the northeast appear to have been the first
to successfully tempt out-of-state residents to temporarily relocate for the
purpose of securing a divorce. Although most required a full year of
residence to establish domicile,76 it was well worth it to those who resided
in neighboring New York given that, prior to 1787, one could only obtain
a divorce by petitioning the legislature.77 As James Kent, writing in 1832,
would remark: “This strictness was productive of public inconvenience,
and often forced the parties . . . to some other state, to avail themselves
of a more easy and certain remedy.”78 Pennsylvania in particular seemed
to be a popular destination, as referenced in a New York legislative
committee report from 1840: “Yet how many unfortunate ‘yoke fellows’
annually seek a refuge from our inexorable law, and take up a residence
in moral Pennsylvania, for the sole purpose of dissolving a connection
which has been productive of nothing but bitter unhappiness.”79
Although New York would eventually begin allowing judicial divorce,
courts there could only bestow one upon those spouses who could prove
that the other had committed adultery.80 Thus, New York marriages that
were free of adultery could only be dissolved through one of two means,
either manufacturing “adultery” or relocating to a state with more
See RILEY, supra note 36, at 46 (“New York was the only northeastern state to limit
divorce to the sole ground of adultery.”).
75 See JACK HARPSTER, THE GENESIS OF RENO: THE HISTORY OF THE RIVERSIDE HOTEL
AND THE VIRGINIA STREET BRIDGE 69 (2016).
76 As Blake explains, “[t]his was a more patient generation than ours, and divorce
seekers did not expect to win their freedom in a mere six weeks. At a year’s residence was
required in all eastern states, and in otherwise liberal Connecticut three years was
specified.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 117.
77 J. Herbie DiFonzo, Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has
Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 564 (2007) (noting how, in New York in 1787,
“the power to grant such relief resided in the legislature with no provision for a trial on
the facts”).
78 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW VOL. II 70 (1860).
79 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 117 (quoting from report).
80 See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 443-44 (1988) (noting that, in 1787, New York passed a law that “specified
adultery as the sole ground for divorce,” and that law “remained substantially unchanged
for almost two centuries”).
74
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favorable divorce laws. The first option was quite popular as Joanne
Grossman and Lawrence Friedman describe:
New York developed what has been called soft-core
adultery. The husband would check in to a hotel. A
woman (for some reason, she was usually a blonde) would
come to his room. They would take off some of their
clothes (usually not all) . . .[T]here would be a knock on
the door—a maid with towels, or a bellboy with a
telegram. Then a photographer would burst in and take
pictures. The woman would then collect her fee ($50 was
normal), and disappear. The photos would show up in
court, as evidence of adultery.81
For the more affluent,82 however, the option of migratory divorce
provided another pathway to divorce—one that did not require the
spouses to engage in collusive perjury.
In mid-nineteenth century America, Ohio83 and Illinois84 became
popular divorce destinations, but it was the unique attributes of
Indiana’s laws that made it especially attractive to those seeking a quick
divorce.85 As Nelson Blake has described, the law there included “two
unusual features.”86 The first was an “omnibus clause” that permitted
Indiana courts to grant a divorce not only for the enumerated grounds,
but for “any other cause, and in any other case, where the court, in their
discretion, shall consider it reasonable and proper that a divorce should
be granted.”87 The second was the state’s “almost non-existent residency

GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 167.
See Wylene Rholetter, New York, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 18, at 880 (“Migratory divorce was the choice of the wealthy.”);
Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals,
Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 614 n.21 (1999)
(“[M]igratory divorces were common only among the wealthy who could afford an
extended trip to a jurisdiction that granted quick divorces.”).
83 See JONES, supra note 47, at 23 (noting that Ohio’s liberalism lay in having a
substantial number of grounds (10), several of which lent themselves to a broad
interpretation”).
84 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 118 (“After the Civil War Chicago gained renown as
a divorce Mecca.”).
85 What all three had in common, however, was their proximity to the east. As one
historian describes, “the impetus for change had passed from the northeastern U.S. to
what has become known as the Old Northwest (Ohio, Indiana and Illinois).” JONES, supra
note 47, at 22.
86 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 119.
87 Michael Grossberg & Amy Elson, Family Law in Indiana: A Domestic Relations
Crossroads, in THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW 60, 64 (David J. Bodenhamer & Randall T.
Shepard eds., 2006).
81
82
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requirement,”88 which required only that the plaintiff be a “bona fide
resident of the county,” for which the plaintiff’s “own affidavit was
accepted as prima facie evidence.”89 An 1860 editorial in the Indiana
Daily Journal bemoaned the fact that the convergence of these two
provisions “gave the whole Union a chance to be divorced here and
flooded our courts with the abomination of half the dishonored homes on
the continent.”90 Indeed, from 1867 to 1871, Indiana was first in the
nation for granting divorces to those who were married in other states.91
Although many in Indiana were delighted—chief among them divorce
attorneys and boardinghouse operators92—others in the state became
concerned with this growing notoriety and eventually succeeded in 1859
in lobbying the legislature to enact a one-year residency requirement93
that was subsequently increased to two years in 1873.94 By 1881, Indiana
had fallen from first all the way to seventh in the rankings of divorce
granting states.95
With Indiana out of the running, the race was on for the next state to
dominate the business of migratory divorce. Between the 1870s and
1880s, Iowa, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia all96 had some
degree of success in attracting “the pseudo-tourists of the divorce
trade,”97 but as Blake put it, “the path of divorce—like that of the
empire—seemed destined to move westward.”98 And much of that
movement had to do with mining, or more specifically, the short
residency requirements many of the western territories had established
Jennifer Ann Drobac, Jazzing Up Family Law: The First Annual Midwest Family
Law Conference, 42 IND. L. REV. 533, 542 (2009)
89 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 119.
90 See Val Nolan Jr., Indiana: Birthplace of Migratory Divorce, 526 IND. L.J. 515, 520
88

n.22 (1951) (quoting editorial)
91 Id. at 526. In fact, during that period, Indiana was responsible for granting
approximately ten percent of the divorces in the nation, averaging between 1096 and 1210
per year. Id.
92 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 120 (noting that “Indiana lawyers and boardinghouse
keepers were happy to accommodate the migrants”); Drobac, supra note 88, at 542
(“While this divorce industry might have been good for Indiana businesses and services,
especially those provided by Indiana lawyers, sister states such as New York, with no
such legal escapes, decried the practice.”).
93 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 65. Additionally, “[p]roof of residency beyond the
petitioner’s affidavit was also required.” Id.
94 See Drobac, supra note 88, at 543 n.84 (noting that “the residency requirement
increased to one year in 1859 and two years in 1873”). Apparently, even after the
enactment of the one-year residency requirement, Indiana “remained sufficiently inviting
to bring many divorce seekers to the state.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 120.
95 Nolan, supra note 90, at 526 (“Indiana fell from first in the nation between 1967
through 1871 to fourth during the next five year period, and seventh in the next.”).
96 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 121.
97 BARBER, supra note 10, at 90.
98 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 121.
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to cater to the large number of miners who were relocating there.99 Of
course, these laws had nothing to do with marriage or divorce but were
instead “[o]riginally intended to hasten the ability of transient miners
and other new arrivals to vote in territorial and, later, state elections.”100
Divorce seekers soon learned, however, that a short residency
requirement, coupled with laws providing more liberal grounds for
divorce, offered an avenue for those living out-of-state to obtain a
relatively quick divorce. For that reason, both the Utah Territory and the
Dakota Territory emerged as popular destinations for those seeking
divorces.101 In Utah, the divorce statute required only that the plaintiff
be “a resident of the Territory, or wishes to become one,”102 while the
Dakota Territory enacted a mere three-month residency requirement—
one that was subsequently retained by the resulting states of North and
South Dakota.103 In both Utah and the Dakotas, however, negative
publicity eventually led to the passage of stricter laws—laws that
effectively ended the migratory divorce trade in those states.104 It would
be another western territory, however, that would prove steadfast in
maintaining its favorable divorce laws and, as time wore on, would make
it increasingly easier for those traveling from out of state to obtain a
divorce. Indeed, when it came to migratory divorce, “the winner, in the
long run, was Nevada.”105
Nevada’s success stemmed from an 1861 law that the then-territory
passed regarding residency. Once again, motivated by the large number
of miners flooding into the state, the law only required six months of
continuous residence.106 Miners soon learned, however, that the law
(which Nevada retained when it became a state in 1864) also made it
easier for them to obtain a divorce. And this ability was quite attractive
to them given that, as one commentator describes, “[m]iners who came to
99

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See RILEY, supra note 36, at 135 (noting that the law was “intended to

100

accommodate the needs of a highly mobile population of miners and entrepreneurs”).
101 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 122-23.
102 Id. at 122. Utah also maintained, in addition to its enumerated grounds, an
omnibus clause, stating that a judge could also grant a divorce “when it shall be made to
appear to the satisfaction and conviction of the court that the parties cannot live in peace
and union together and that their welfare requires a separation.” RILEY, supra note 36,
at 96.
103 See JONES, supra note 47, at 33 (noting that “[t]he Dakotas had the most lenient
residence requirements in the period 1879-1899”).
104 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 122-23 (describing how “the territorial legislature [of
Utah] eventually slammed the door by enacting a one-year residence requirement and
abolishing the omnibus clause”); RILEY, supra note 36, at 100-01 (discussing how South
Dakota increased its residence requirement to one-year in 1909 and North Dakota did so
in 1899).
105 GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 169.
106 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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find fortunes in the Comstock often found new lives and new loves. If
they were going to establish new families—legally—they had to be sure
of legal separation from former mates.”107 Nevada safeguarded that
ability by maintaining its short residency requirement, but also by
adopting relatively liberal grounds for divorce. As historian Alicia Barber
explains:
New York, for instance, provided only one ground for
divorce, adultery. [In contrast,] Nevada had retained
seven grounds for divorce: desertion, cruelty, nonsupport,
drunkenness, impotency, imprisonment, and adultery.
To make matters even easier, many of these grounds, like
“cruelty” were quite open to interpretation; in addition,
no evidence was required to prove any of these charges,
[thus allowing] unhappy spouses to pursue divorce
without stating much of a reason at all.108
For a time, these peculiarities of Nevada law would remain somewhat
unknown to those outside the state. Near the turn of the twentieth
century, however, something “unexpected”109 happened—an event that
would catapult Reno, Nevada, into the consciousness of the nation and
lead to its ultimate reputation as the “refuge of restless hearts.”110
The event in question was the arrival of Laura Corey, who came to
Reno in 1905 by “private railroad car of steel magnate Charles
Schwab”111 with “a retinue of maids and servants.”112 Corey was the wife
of U.S. Steel President William E. Corey, and the two had been married
for twenty-two years.113 Mrs. Corey, however, did not behave like the
typical tourist. For instance, she did not check into a local hotel but
instead signed a six-month lease for a furnished home “at a very high
rent.”114 A great deal of publicity attended her arrival, with reporters
repeatedly asking whether there was any truth to the rumors that she
was there to get a divorce so that her husband could marry actress Mabel

BARBARA LAND & MYRICK LAND, A SHORT HISTORY OF RENO 47 (1995)
BARBER, supra note 10, at 54; see also Katherine L. Caldwell, Not Ozzie and
Harriet: Postwar Divorce and the American Liberal Welfare State, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1, 39–40 (1998) (describing Nevada as a divorce mill that “offer[ed] ‘quickie’ divorces on
grounds such as ‘mental cruelty’ very liberally defined”).
109 See BARBER, supra note 10, at 53.
110 Id. at 58.
107
108

111
112
113

eye”).
114

Id.

HARPSTER, supra note 75, at 86.
LAND & LAND, supra note 107, at 48 (noting that “the steel tycoon had a wondering

Id.
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Gilman.115 Corey adamantly denied these rumors: “There is no truth in
that foolish story. . . . To even think that my husband is infatuated with
an actress is ridiculous. I am not in Nevada to get a divorce, but came
with my sister-in-law and her friend for the benefit of the latter’s
health.”116 Nonetheless, once she had been in Reno the requisite sixmonths, Corey immediately filed for and received a divorce on the
grounds of desertion.117 She soon left Reno for Pennsylvania, and her exhusband did indeed marry Ms. Gilman the following year.118 The whole
affair was quite the scandal, but because the public came to see Mrs.
Corey as the wronged party, “Nevada’s prompt and easy surgery won
wide applause.”119
In July 1906, the New York Times reported Corey’s divorce decree on
its front page, but publicity of this sort was only the beginning. As one
historian described it, “Laura Corey may have left Reno, but the national
spotlight did not.”120 Soon, countless people across the country began
following Mrs. Corey’s lead and traveled to Reno in order to obtain their
own speedy divorce121—or to get “Reno-vated” as some began to call it.122
Such pilgrimages were made easier by enterprising attorneys who,
sensing a business opportunity, moved to Reno and began advertising
their divorce services in publications nationwide. For instance, in 1907,
attorney William Schnitzer moved from New York City to Reno and
promptly opened a practice specializing in divorce.123 He soon published
a pamphlet, entitled “Marriage and Divorce,” which he distributed to
“more than 2000 lawyers in New York and Canada.”124 Such efforts paid
115 Id. at 54; see also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE 71 (2010) (noting that William Corey had “unceremoniously deserted his wife
and family for the attractive musical-comedy singer, Mabel Gilman”).
116 See BARBER, supra note 10, at 54 (quoting Expects a Divorce, ALTOONA MIRROR,
Dec. 7, 1905).
117 Id. at 55.
118

Id.

BLAKE, supra note 11, at 153; see also BOORSTIN, supra note 115, at 71 (“The press
fumed with righteous indignation against [William], but praised the laws of Nevada as
the shield of the injured party.”).
120 BARBER, supra note 10, at 56; see also RILEY, supra note 36, at 136 (“The resulting
publicity catapulted Reno into the national spotlight.”).
121 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 136 (noting how the Corey divorce “brought to public
attention . . . the ease of Reno divorce, at least for those who could afford to travel to
Nevada and spend six months there”); BLAKE, supra note 11, at 153 (noting how, after the
Corey divorce, “more and more outsiders began to come to Nevada for divorces”).
122 See GUY CLIFTON, IMAGES OF AMERICA: RENO 7 (2012) (describing how “thousands
of people from throughout the United States [made] their way to town to get ‘The Cure’
or become ‘Reno-vated,’ as the Eastern papers called it”).
123 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 136.
124 BARBER, supra note 10, at 56. As one historian notes, however, “[w]hen the Reno
Bar Association objected to Schnitzer’s advertising as unethical, the Nevada Supreme
Court in 1911 suspended his license to practice for eight months.” BLAKE, supra note 11,
119
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off, and more and more people began traveling to Reno to secure a
divorce. Before long, stories of unhappy spouses who traveled to Reno for
purposes of securing a divorce made their way into a number of popular
movies,125 books,126 plays,127 and even music128 from that time period. As
a result, phrases like “‘going to Reno’ and the ‘Reno cure’ quickly became
nationally recognized euphemisms for seeking a divorce.”129
Not all Nevadans welcomed this newfound publicity, and some took
to heart the public censure that critics began hurling at the state. In
1911, for instance, an editorial in the New York Times declared that
“[t]he divorce mill itself is a scandal. Reno has made itself a reproach and
a shame.”130 When former president Theodore Roosevelt visited the state
in 1911, he reportedly declared “that no city or State could long exist by
harboring divorce and building up a colony of married people who sought
to be rid of their mates.”131 Nevadans would soon join these calls for
change, and in 1913 the state’s leading newspaper at the time published
an editorial, warning readers that “[t]his state and this city cannot
advance permanently unless they be fortified not only in self-respect, but
in the respect of all who think of us. Any work too damaging for any other
state to do is certainly too damaging for Nevada to do.” 132
Eventually, on February 7, 1913, this dissatisfaction came to a head,
and over 150 angry Nevadans marched on the state capital demanding
change.133 As one historian, writing in 1962, describes:
[T]he militant visitors marched straight to the capitol
building where they crowded in to the assembly chamber,
overflowing the gallery and standing in every available
space on the floor of the house itself. The clergyman who
made the opening prayer called God’s attention to the
fact that the eyes of the commonwealth and the nation
were upon Nevada and asked “that strength be given that
at 153.

125 See, e.g., A RENO DIVORCE (Warner Bros. 1927), THE ROAD TO RENO (Paramount
Pictures 1931), MERRY WIVES OF RENO (Warner Bros. 1934), MAISIE GOES TO RENO (MGM
1944), THE MISFITS (Seven Arts Productions 1961).
126 See, e.g., EDITH WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY (1913); FAITH BALDWIN,
TEMPORARY ADDRESS: RENO (1941).
127 See, e.g., CLARE BOOTH LUCE, THE WOMEN (1936); WINCHELL SMITH & FRANK
BACON, LIGHTNIN’ (1918).
128 See, e.g., WILLIAM JEROME & JEAN SCHWARTZ, I’M ON MY WAY TO RENO (1910).
129 Friedman, supra note 59, at 1505 (“’Going to Reno’ became almost a synonym for
getting a divorce.”); see also BARBER, supra note 10, at 57 (“For better or for worse, Reno
was now literally a household name.”).
130 Sensitive Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1911, at 10.
131 Roosevelt Assails Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1911, at 1.
132 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155.
133 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 136 (putting the number at 160).
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the state be freed from the curses which beset her.”134

The reformers’ efforts worked. The Nevada legislature voted to amend
the law and institute a one-year residency requirement for those whose
spouse resided outside of the state.135
With that change in the law, however, came the realization of just
how much the state economy had benefitted from migratory divorce.
After all, each Reno divorce typically brought with it a number of
temporary residents: “a plaintiff; a defendant, unless the divorce was
uncontested; other family members; witnesses; often friends and
supporters; and in the case of wealthy divorce-seekers, maids and
servants.”136 Further, each of these people would have needed to remain
in the state for six months, resulting in considerable revenue for a
number of Nevadans. As one historian describes it: “Lawyers and lodging
operators profited most directly, but the ripple effect spread to clothing
stores, restaurants, salons, pharmacies, and other businesses that
provided services to them as well as the permanent population.”137 By
raising the residency period to a full year, however, Nevada had lost
much of its appeal as a divorce destination, thus eroding the ample
revenue from which so many Nevadans had come to depend.138 Many
Nevadans were none too pleased with this prospect of reduced
income139—a sentiment reflected in the words of a Nevada’s poet writing
in the early 1900s:
Have you ever thought about the Reno Colony,
And what we owe this little fad, divorce?
Fair plaintiffs oft advising,
Forever criticising,
Yet their money helps us on a bit, of course.
If you legislate against the Reno colony,
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155.
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 88 (noting that the residency requirement was
extended “to twelve months for parties with only one spouse residing in Nevada”); BLAKE,
supra note 11, at 155 (describing how, in light of the reformers’ demonstration, “the
prodivorce majority melted away, and the one-year residence bill was expedited toward
final passage”).
136 HARPSTER, supra note 75, at 136.
137 BARBER, supra note 10, at 85.
138 See RILEY, supra note 36, at 136 (pointing out how “business people and
entrepreneurs . . . missed the revenues, including transportation costs, legal fees,
entertainment, meals, and lodging that the divorce trade put into their pockets”).
139 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155-56 (“The reformers’ victory was bitterly resented
by the lawyers, hotelkeepers, and merchants who had profited from the divorce colony.”);
BOORSTIN, supra note 115, at 71 (pointing out that “lawyers, merchants, bartenders,
hotelkeepers, and others quickly registered their protest”).
134
135
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To other fields the fair ones you will drive.
For ill-advised propriety
Brings poverty with piety,
And some of us would prefer to thrive.140
As such resentments grew, Nevadans would once again demand a change
in the law, this time using the ballot box.
In 1914—the very same year that the new residency requirement
took effect—Nevadans would successfully vote out of office a number of
state politicians seen as responsible for the change in the law. Included
in that group were the governor, Tasker Oddie, who had signed the oneyear residency requirement into law as well as a number of state
legislators who had voted in favor of it.141 The following year, their
replacements succeeded in reinstating the six-month residency
provision.142 In so doing, the new governor, Emmet D. Boyle, said that
any future changes should come from the people, by way of popular
referendum: “Moral and social questions on which the people are divided,
should, if possible, be kept out of the legislature where they tend to
obscure legislation where they tend to obscure legislation of even greater
moment to the serious detriment of good government.”143 Citizens
attempted to do just that in 1922, when they placed a proposition on the
ballot to again raise the residency requirement to one year.144 The
proposal lost by a vote of three to one.145
Going forward, Nevada not only embraced its status as a divorce
haven but would now actively attempt to ward off any competitors who
sought to siphon off portions of that industry.146 In 1927, as countries like
Mexico and France began to horn in on the migratory divorce trade,
Nevada reduced its residency requirement even further to three
months.147 When it then became evident that Idaho and Arkansas
LESLIE CURTIS, RENO REVERIES 83 (1924).
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156; see also HARPSTER, supra note 75, at 111 (“Governor
Tasker Oddie signed the measure, but he and many of the legislators paid the price when
they were defeated at the polls the following year.”).
142 See BARBER, supra note 10, at 85 (describing how those in favor of reinstating the
earlier law, “with the help of many new faces in the legislature, as well as a new
governor,” succeeded).
143 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156.
144 Id.; RILEY, supra note 36, at 137.
145 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156; RILEY, supra note 36, at 137.
146 See BOORSTIN, supra note 115, at 71 (“Nevada still had competitors, and the
legislature remained alert.”); RILEY, supra note 36, at 137 (noting that Nevada was
“[a]lways under pressure from other divorce mill states”).
147 Id. (adding that there was also “a rumor that Wyoming might reduce her residence
requirement”); see also BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156-57 (“It was imperative to keep
Nevada’s divorce attractions bright in competition with those of France, Mexico, and
other potential competitors.”).
140
141
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intended to likewise lower their residency requirements to three months,
Nevada doubled down and, in 1931, lowered it again to a mere six
weeks.148 In response, one of the headlines from that time read “Revival
of Gold Rush Days Predicted. Best This One, If You Can.”149 It was no
coincidence that, in the very same year, Nevada also legalized gambling,
which meant that those who traveled to the state to obtain a divorce now
had even more ways to spend their money as they whiled away the
required six weeks.150 And, to maximize the time these Reno divorce
seekers would have to spend in the state, the 1931 divorce law “required
a sworn witness to testify that the divorce-seeker had been sighted in the
state each and every day for six weeks.”151 Statistics from that year reveal
that Nevada had the highest divorce rate in the country—four times the
national average, in fact.152 It was further estimated that the divorce
trade brought between $1 million and $5 million per year to the state.153
As one commentator from that period remarked, “[s]ince divorce is a
$4,000,000-a-year industry for Reno, you might as well move all orange
trees out of Florida as take the divorce business from Nevada.”154
Of course, with revenues that large, it was no surprise that other
states would take notice. As one scholar writing in 1935 put it: “Other
states came to envy the monopolization by Nevada of such a lucrative
business, and competition unsheathed its sharpened claws.”155 In
addition to Idaho and Arkansas, mentioned earlier,156 states like
Wyoming, Florida, and Alabama were also eager to obtain their share of
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 157; BOORSTIN, supra note 115, at 71; see also BARBER,
supra note 10, at 118 (noting that “Reno’s hold on the lucrative divorce industry . . .
148

seemed even more precarious once Idaho and Arkansas each” adopted three-month
residency provisions); PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 196 (describing the “veritable divorce
trade war [that] broke out among states such as Nevada, Idaho, and Arkansas”).
149 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 157.
150 I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 374 (2010) (“The Great Depression gave birth to the third
wave of legal gambling. Nevada re-legalized casino gambling in 1931.”); see also BARBER,
supra note 10, at 119 (noting that, when it came to reducing the residency requirement
and legalizing gambling, “the two bills were in many ways intertwined”); RILEY, supra
note 36, at 137 (“[L]iberal gambling provisions guaranteed that divorce-seekers would be
able to amuse themselves—and spend more money—while they waited for their
residencies to become final”).
151 BARBER, supra note 10, at 135.
152 Id. at 129; see also RILEY, supra note 36, at 137 (noting that, from 1930 to 1931,
Nevada went from granting 2,609 divorces per year to 5,260).
153 RUSSELL R. ELLIOT, HISTORY OF NEVADA (2d ed.) 285 (1987); see also HARPSTER,
supra note 75, at 125 (“It has been estimated that the divorce business in Reno accounted
for more than $5 million annually at the time (equivalent to $66 million today).”).
154 SHEPHERD, supra note 29, at 50.
155 Frank W. Ingram and G. A. Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in
Nevada, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 302, 306 (1935).
156 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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the migratory divorce business. In 1935, for instance, the Wyoming
legislature reduced the state’s residency requirement from one year to
sixty days.157 That same year, Florida reduced its one-year residency
requirement to three months.158 The Florida representative who
introduced the law had this to say in support of the measure: “If they are
going to get divorces, we can’t stop them and we might as well invite them
to Florida to spend the money.”159 And indeed, Florida did enjoy
considerable success as a divorce haven. As Blake describes: “In 1946, at
the peak of the postwar rise in divorce, Florida granted over 26,000
divorces. The rate per thousand population was 12.1, second only to that
in Nevada.”160 That success, however, would end in 1957 when the
governor persuaded state lawmakers to raise the residency requirement
to six months.161
Ultimately, the most successful challenger was Alabama, which for
a period of time even eclipsed the popularity of Nevada as a divorce
destination. It all started in 1945 when Alabama amended its law to
provide that the state’s one-year residency requirement did not apply
“when the court has jurisdiction of both parties to the cause of action.”162
Thus, in the absence of any specific period of residence, “if either party
was a bona fide resident of the state, the Alabama courts would assume
jurisdiction to grant divorce either for or against him, provided the other
party submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by making a general
appearance.”163 And apparently there was no shortage of Alabama
attorneys willing to misrepresent the residency status of those who had
only just arrived in the state. As a story in TIME magazine from 1962
described:
The fact is that for several years now, the easiest divorce
terms in the nation are to be found not in Nevada but in
157 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 167 (noting nonetheless that Wyoming’s tourist business
was likely “modest”).
158
159

Id.
Id.; see also C. Jonathan Hauck Jr., Birds of Passage, 28 GEO. L. J. 809, 811 n. 32

(1940). (describing how, when the representative was asked if this measure was intended
to put Florida into competition with Nevada, he replied: “It is in competition to all the
United States; it is to get people to come to Florida”).
160BLAKE, supra note 11, at 168. Among the states attempting to compete for the
migratory divorce business at that time, “only Florida had the tourist attractions and
easy accessibility to compete with Nevada.” JONES, supra note 47, at 110.
161 Id. at 168-69 (noting that, in response to amending the law, the governor “praised
the legislature for taking action that would “enhance the prestige of our state
everywhere”).
162 See Migratory Divorce: The Alabama Experience, 75 HARV. L. REV. 568, 569-70
(1962); Jennings v. Jennings, 36 So. 2d 236, 237 (Ala. 1948) (laying out the full text of the
amendment).
163 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 169.
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Alabama. A divorce seeker need show up in Alabama only
long enough to meet a lawyer, pay a fee, fill out the
papers and wait a few hours. The lawyer shoots off
usually to a rural county, hires a local lawyer to handle
the court work, gets a decree and hops back to his
client.164

In the two decades following Alabama’s change to its residency
requirement, the state’s divorce rate rose by 400%.165 In 1960, for
instance, Nevada granted 9,274 divorces while Alabama granted more
than 17,000.166 Alabama’s numbers would only start to drop when the
state amended its rules of professional responsibility to prohibit
attorneys from assisting clients in misrepresenting their status as an
Alabama resident in order to obtain a quick divorce167—a law that would
eventually lead to the indictment and disbarment of several attorneys
and even two judges.168
Nevada, on the other hand, would stay the course until the very
end, and even to this day maintains a residency period of six-weeks for
purposes of receiving a divorce.169 As the 1960s drew to a close, however,
“one of the pillars of [the state’s] tourist economy began to crumble.”170
That pillar, of course, was the migratory divorce trade, its decline
primarily attributable to the increasingly liberal divorce laws that began
sweeping the country.171 In 1968, for instance, New York amended its
Alabamy Unbound, TIME, Jan. 5, 1962, at 47.
Wylene Rholetter, Alabama, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 18, at 56.
164
165

OF

DIVORCE: AN

KELLY KAZEK, FORGOTTEN TALES OF ALABAMA 95 (1910).
See Migratory Divorce, supra note 162, at 569. The amended rule provided as
follows:
166
167

No person heretofore or hereafter admitted to practice law in Alabama
shall . . . while acting as attorney for either party in any suit for
divorce in any court in Alabama represent to the court or conspire with
any party, attorney, or person to represent to the court that either
party to such suit is a bona fide resident of Alabama, knowing such
representation to be false.

Id.

168 KAZEK, supra note 166, at 97; see also Rholetter, supra note 165, at 56 (“It was
not until the early 1960s—when the Alabama Bar Association, in a self-policing action,
took a stand against the migratory divorces by disbarring some of its members.”).
169 See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125.020(1)(e).
170 BARBER, supra note 10, at 180.
171 Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues for Divorce - From Fault
through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 67 (1976). (“But there were broader
pressures building up for reform—pressures more powerful than the greed of those who
profited from divorce mills.”).
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divorce laws to allow for grounds other than adultery172 and South
Carolina finally began to permit judicial divorce in the late 1940s.173 In
addition, in 1970, California would become the first state to enact nofault divorce,174 whereby “[i]nstead of holding a trial to determine
whether a spouse was guilty of a serious marital offense, no fault statutes
allowed spouses to obtain divorces by mutual consent or on grounds of
incompatibility or ‘irretrievable breakdown’ of the marriage.”175 By the
mid-80s, most of the other states would likewise adopt some form of nofault divorce.176 Thus, “[f]rom being almost impossible without evidence
of fault or the agreement of one’s spouse,” divorce had become essentially
unilateral throughout the United States.177 And, with that legal
development, migratory divorce “retreated into insignificance,” relegated
to “little more than a subject for historical study.”178
III. LEGAL REACTIONS
For migratory divorce to work as intended, states had to be willing to
recognize out-of-state divorces secured by their citizens during a
temporary stay in the degree granting state. And indeed, many states
were willing do just that out of comity.179 Some states, however, refused.
See id. (listing the new grounds as “cruelty, abandonment, and two-years’
separation”); Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1977) (“With the
enactment of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, New York abandoned its position as the
only State in the union which regarded adultery as the sole ground for absolute divorce.”)
(internal citations omitted).
173 See James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism and American Legal
History: The Southern Experience, 39 VAND. L. REV. 539, 564 n. 129 (1986); see generally
J.D. Sumner, Jr., The South Carolina Divorce Act of 1949, 3 S.C. L.Q. 253, 257-59 (1951).
174 Friedman & Percival, supra note 171, at 67 (noting that, in doing so, California
“abolished divorce as it had been classically constituted. In its place came ‘dissolution’ of
marriage—available when ‘irreconcilable differences’ cause the ‘irremediable breakdown’
of a marriage”).
175 Mintz, supra note 337, at 655.
176 As Lawrence Friedman would write in 1984: “California was a pioneer state, but
no-fault is now the rule almost everywhere.” Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage:
Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984); see also Lauren
Guidice, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault in A No Fault System, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 787,
796 (2011) (“By the mid-1980s, all states had some form of a no-fault provision integrated
into their divorce law.”)
177 ALLEN PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG 18 (2019).
178 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED States
§13:2, at 724 (2d ed. 1987).
179 See Cavers, supra note 29, at 103. As defined by the Supreme Court:
172

“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
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They balked at the idea that one of its resident citizens could have his or
her marriage dissolved by a sister state simply because that person’s
spouse spent a certain amount of time in the sister state. Thus, the
question arose as to when a state was required to recognize a foreign
divorce. And given the inability of those opposed to migratory divorce to
otherwise curb the practice through a constitutional amendment180 or
uniform legislation,181 “the burden of prescribing such policies and
criteria [was] shouldered”182 by the Supreme Court. Indeed, over a period
of time spanning more than seventy years, the Court would issue twelve
opinions on the subject—opinions that represented the Court’s evolving
views on the issue and which would ultimately effect tremendous change
in the law of domestic relations.183

A. The Supreme Court: Comity versus Full Faith and Credit
The Supreme Court’s first exposure to migratory divorce came in
1858 with the case of Barber v. Barber.184 There, Hiram Barber and
Huldah Adeline Barber were married in New York.185 Huldah eventually
received a legal separation that required Hiram to pay alimony, but in
an attempt to avoid paying, Hiram “plac[ed] himself beyond the
jurisdiction of the court which could enforce it” by moving to Wisconsin
and divorcing Huldah.186 The case presented only the discrete question
of whether Huldah could file suit in Wisconsin to enforce the New York
order, and the Court agreed that she could.187 Thus, Barber did not
provide an opportunity to answer the larger question that migratory
divorce would soon bring to the forefront of the evolving law of domestic
relations in the United States—namely, whether and to what extent one
state, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution,188
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The
doctrine of comity thus grants a court the discretion to recognize a foreign judgment
without compelling it to do so.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
See infra Part III.A.
181 See infra Part III.B.
182 Sumner, supra note , at 1.
183 See infra Part IV.
184 62 U.S. 582 (1858).3
185 Id. at 584.
186 Id. at 583.
187 Id. at 584 (“The record raises these inquiries: Whether a wife . . . can acquire
another domiciliation in a State of this Union different from that of her husband, to
entitle her, by her next friend, to sue him in a court of the United States having equity
jurisdiction, to recover from him alimony due.”).
188 U.S. CONST., art. IV § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
180
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is required to recognize a divorce obtained in a sister state.
The Court would first weigh in on that question in 1869 when it
decided Cheever v. Wilson.189 In that case, Mrs. Cheever traveled to
Indiana (a popular divorce destination of the time),190 where she filed for
divorce.191 Mr. Cheever not only participated in the Indiana proceeding
but consented to the dissolution.192 Divorce in hand, Mrs. Cheever left
Indiana, but a property dispute in Washington D.C. subsequently arose
between her and a third party—one that implicated the Indiana divorce
settlement.193 The lower court ruled that the foreign divorce decree was
void, but the Supreme Court reversed, invoking the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and holding that “[t]he Constitution and laws of the United States
give the decree the same effect elsewhere which it had in Indiana.”194 In
response to the argument that Mrs. Cheever did not actually reside in
Indiana at the time of the divorce, the Court was satisfied by the fact that
the divorce decree “expressly found” that she was a resident, and no party
had produced evidence to suggest otherwise.195
The Court’s job in Cheever was made somewhat easier by the fact
that Mr. Cheever had participated in the Indiana divorce. In 1888,
however, the Supreme Court would rely on principles it first identified in
Pennoyer v. Neff196 to hold that a court can grant a divorce even in the
absence of jurisdiction over the non-resident spouse.197 The case was
Maynard v. Hill, and it involved a husband who obtained a legislative
divorce in Oregon.198 The wife was not a resident of Oregon and claimed
that she never received notice of the pending action.199 The Court
described the issue as follows: “If the assembly possessed the power to
grant a divorce in any case, its jurisdiction to legislate upon his status,
he being a resident of the territory is undoubted, unless the marriage was
a contract within the prohibition of the federal constitution against its

be proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
189 76 U.S. 108 (1869).
190 See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
191 76 U.S. at 109.
192 Id. at 110 (noting that Mr. Cheever filed “a cross-bill, setting forth . . . that he had
abandoned her with intent never to live with her again; that reconciliation was
impossible: and he, too, on his part concluded his petition with a prayer for” divorce).
193 Id. at 111-12.
194 Id. at 123.
195 Id. (“The finding is clearly sufficient until overcome by adverse testimony. None
adequate to that result is found in the record.”).
196 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
197 See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 386 (2007) (noting the Court’s reliance on Pennoyer when
deciding Maynard).
198 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
199 Id. at 193.
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impairment by legislation.”200 The Court ruled that marriage is, indeed,
a status or an institution and not a contract: “though formed by contract,
it signifies the relation of husband and wife, deriving both its rights and
duties from a source higher than any contract of which the parties are
capable, and, as to these, uncontrollable by any contract which they can
make.”201 In essence, the Court recognized divorce as an in rem action
and upheld the validity of the Oregon divorce, although largely focusing
on the right of a legislature to issue a divorce and essentially ignoring
the wife’s claim that she never received notice.202
In 1901, the Court would again take up the subject of migratory
divorce, issuing three opinions on the subject. In two of them, the Court
held that a state was not required to recognize a migratory divorce when
the party who procured it did not establish domicil in the divorce
granting state. For instance, in Bell v. Bell, the husband obtained a
Pennsylvania divorce by representing that he had resided in the state for
the required one year period.203 Just ten weeks prior to that
representation, however, he had represented himself as a resident of New
York in a separate action there to probate a will.204 For that reason, the
Court held that “the court in Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction of the
husband's suit for divorce, because neither party had a domicil in
Pennsylvania, and the decree of divorce was entitled to no faith and
credit in New York or in any other state.”205 Similarly, in Streitwolf v.
Streitwolf, the husband obtained a divorce in North Dakota after
representing himself as having resided there for 90 days when, in fact,
he had only spent a few weeks in the state, spending the remainder of
that time either back home in New York or traveling through
Yellowstone National Park.206
In the third case, however, the Court ruled that the state of New York
was required to recognize a Kentucky divorce. The case was Atherton v.
Atherton, and although it technically did not involve migratory divorce,
Id. at 209.
Id. at 212. The Court added that, “[w]hen formed, this relation is no more a
contract than ‘fatherhood’ or ‘sonship’ is a contract.'” Id.
202 See Mark Strasser, Divorce, Domicile, and the Constitution, 108 KY. L.J. 301,
200
201

304–05 (2020) (noting how “the Court simply did not address whether Lydia's allegation
that she had not received actual or constructive notice of the divorce, if true, was a basis
upon which the divorce should be nullified. Instead, the Court focused on whether
a legislature rather than a judge could issue a divorce”) see also Sumner, supra note 3, at
4 (“In this country a divorce suit has always been regarded as in the nature of an in rem
proceeding. Consequently, it is held that judicial jurisdiction over the defendant spouse
is not necessary, as it is in the ordinary adversary proceeding.”).
203 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
204 Id. at 177 (noting that, in that action, he described himself “as residing at Buffalo,
in the county of Erie and state of New York”).
205 Id. at 178.
206 181 U.S. 179, 182 (1901).
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the Court’s rationale would prove instrumental in subsequent cases
dealing with migratory divorce.207 There, the couple had married in New
York but ultimately resided in Kentucky until such time as the wife,
claiming that the husband was abusive, returned to New York.208 He
subsequently obtained a Kentucky divorce on the grounds of
abandonment.209 In ruling that the judgment was binding on New York,
the Court introduced the concept of “matrimonial domicile.”210
Specifically, the Court held that because Kentucky was the state in which
the couple had last resided as a married couple and the husband had
continued to reside there after the wife returned to New York, the divorce
was entitled to full faith and credit.211
In 1903, however, the Court went further and issued a more
controversial opinion, holding that a state need not recognize a foreign
divorce even when the spouse who procured it had satisfied the residency
requirement of the divorce granting state. In Andrews v. Andrews,
Charles and Kate Andrews were married and subsequently resided in
Massachusetts.212 Four years later, Charles desired a divorce and thus
traveled to South Dakota, where he seemingly resided long enough to
establish residency.213 He then returned to Massachusetts, where he
remarried.214 When he died, both wives came forward claiming to be his
widow.215 The second wife pointed to the foreign divorce as evidence that
his first marriage legally terminated, but the Massachusetts court
refused to recognize the divorce on the basis of state law, which provided
that a divorce is invalid “if an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into
another state or country to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred
here, while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not
authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth.”216 Finding that
Charles’ time in South Dakota was insufficient to have established a
“bona fide domicil,”217 the Supreme Court agreed that Massachusetts

181 U.S. 155 (1901).
Id. at 155-56.
209 Id. at 157.
210 Id. at 158.
211 Id. at 162 (“There can be no doubt that this decree was by law and usage entitled
to full faith and credit as an absolute decree of divorce in the state of Kentucky.”).
212 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
213 Id. at 16 (noting that “he remained personally in that state a period of time longer
than is necessary by the laws of said state to gain a domicil there”).
214 Id. at 17.
215 Id. at 15.
216 Id. at 29.
217 Id. at 27. In so doing, the Court upheld the lower court which had found “that
Andrews had always retained his domicil in Massachusetts, had gone to Dakota for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, in fraud of the laws of Massachusetts, and with the
intention of returning to that state when the divorce was procured.” Id.
207
208
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could constitutionally refuse to recognize the South Dakota divorce.218
Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that a state is
not bound by a foreign divorce issued in a state where the party
requesting that divorce was not domiciled at the time, even if the party
had established residency in that state. In 1906, however, the Court
would take what Justice Brown described as “a step backward in
American jurisprudence,”219 and hold that even in the face of a foreign
domicil a state need not recognize a divorce from a sister state. The case
was Haddock v. Haddock, and it involved a couple that were married in
New York.220 Shortly after the marriage, the husband alone relocated to
Connecticut, where he obtained a divorce.221 It was undisputed, however,
that Connecticut did not have jurisdiction over Mrs. Haddock given that
“the pendency of the petition was by publication and she had not
appeared in the action.”222 The Court began the opinion by recognizing
that the spouses had effectuated separate domiciles—the husband in
Connecticut and the wife in New York.223 It further held that the
Connecticut divorce was valid and enforceable within the state of
Connecticut.224 At the same time, however, the Court ruled that New
York was not bound by the divorce given that the two had never
established “matrimonial domicil”225 in Connecticut.226
The Court believed this resolution necessary given that, “if one
government, because of its authority over its own citizens, has the right
to dissolve the marriage tie as to the citizen of another jurisdiction, it
must follow that no government possesses as to its own citizens, power

218 In explaining why the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not demand otherwise,
the Court noted that “although a particular provision of the Constitution may seemingly
be applicable, its controlling effect is limited by the essential nature of the powers of
government reserved to the states when the Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 34.
219 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 564.
221 Id. at 565.
222
223

Id.
Id. at 572 (noting that “the husband . . . at the time when the decree was rendered

[was] domiciled in [Connecticut, while] New York was the domicil of the wife”).
224 Id. (“[N]o question can arise on this record concerning the right of the state of
Connecticut within its borders to give effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor of
the husband by the courts of Connecticut.”).
225 Id. at 527-28 (“Where the domicil of matrimony was in a particular state, and the
husband abandons his wife and goes into another state in order to avoid his marital
obligations, such other state to which the husband has wrongfully fled does not . . . become
a new domicil of matrimony.”).
226 Id. at 605 (“Without questioning the power of the state of Connecticut to enforce
within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in issue, . . . we hold that the
decree of the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances stated was not
entitled to obligatory enforcement in the state of New York by virtue of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.”).
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over the marriage relation and its dissolution.”227 Further, the Court
introduced the idea that marital fault somehow played a role in divorce
jurisdiction, noting that New York could constitutionally disregard the
Connecticut divorce given that Mr. Haddock’s domicil there flowed
directly from his abandonment of his wife.228 As a result, the decision
resulted in a situation whereby the couple was legally married in New
York yet was legally divorced in Connecticut. Ruling as it did, the Court
effectively went back on a key observation it had made in Atherton—
namely, that “[a] husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law.”229 Four justices dissented in Haddock, with
Justice Holmes characterizing the majority opinion as one that “not only
reverses a previous well-considered decision of this court, but is likely to
cause considerable disaster to innocent persons, and to bastardize
children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage.”230
Haddock did indeed engender a great deal of confusion, and
“[c]riticisms of it grew stronger over the years as the rules and exceptions
[it] spawned . . . grew steadily more complicated.”231 In an attempt to
synthesize these various opinions, one commentator described the
uncertainty of the governing rule as follows: “a state was not compelled
to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree unless the rendering state
had as minimum contacts the domicil of one of the parties plus
‘something else.’”232 Nonetheless, it would take over thirty years before
the Court would begin to right the ship, which it first attempted to do in
1938 with Davis v. Davis.233 There, Mark and Maude Davis were married
in Washington D.C., where they resided as husband and wife.234
Eventually the two legally separated, and a D.C. court ordered Mark to
pay alimony.235 Mark subsequently moved to Virginia, where he secured
a divorce on the basis of desertion.236 In so doing, he alleged that he had
resided in Virginia for the one-year period required to establish
domicile.237 Maude appeared specially to contest jurisdiction but was

227
228

Id. at 573.
Id. at 571 (“[I]f the husband . . . abandons their domicil and his wife, to get rid of

all those conjugal obligations which the marriage relation imposes upon him, . . . he yields
up that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil hers.”) (quoting
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 595 (1858)).
229 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).
230 201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
231 Estin, supra note 197, at 389.
232 Sumner, supra note 3, at 5 (emphasis added).
233 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
234 Id. at 35.
235 Mark had received a legal separation on the grounds of cruelty in D.C., where
“absolute divorce was not then permitted for desertion or cruelty.” Id.
236
237

Id.
Id. at 36.
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unsuccessful.238 Mark then attempted to use the Virginia divorce to
modify the earlier judgment of the D.C. court regarding alimony.239
Citing Haddock, the D.C. court refused to recognize the Virginia
divorce.240 On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged the conflicting
tests for “matrimonial domicil” that had arisen post-Haddock but
nonetheless refused to offer any clarification, instead stating that the
case before it did not warrant doing so.241 Instead, the Court
distinguished Davis on the basis that Maude, unlike the wife in Haddock,
had received notice of the Virginia divorce and had even participated in
it to a limited degree, apparently rejecting the argument that Maude had
only appeared for purposes of contesting jurisdiction.242 On that basis,
the Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the D.C.
court to give effect to the husband’s foreign divorce.
Four years later, the Court would go even further and explicitly
overrule Haddock. The case was Williams v. State of North Carolina—
typically referred to as Williams I—and it involved a North Carolina man
and woman who both traveled to Nevada, stayed there the required six
weeks and then divorced their respective spouses.243 The pair then
promptly married one another and returned to North Carolina.244 Upon
their return, they were arrested and convicted of bigamous
cohabitation.245 In challenging their convictions, the case made its way
to the Supreme Court, which was asked to determine “whether a decree
of divorce granted in a state which is not the state of matrimonial
domicile, in which the defendant is not domiciled, and in which the
defendant is not personally served with process and makes no

Id. (“Process of the Virginia court was served personally upon the respondent in
the District of Columbia. She filed a plea stating that she appeared ‘specially and for no
other purpose than to file this plea to the jurisdiction of the court.’”).
239 Id. at 37-38.
240 According to the lower court: “It was necessary . . . under Haddock . . . that Virginia
be the last matrimonial domicil of the parties or, if not, that the wife be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court below, either by personal service within [Virginia], or by
voluntary appearance and participation in the suit.” Id. at 39 (internal quotes omitted)
241 Id. at 41 (noting that, although a single definition for “matrimonial domicil” both
“is not to be found; it need not be attempted here”).
242 Id. at 43 (“Plainly her plea and conduct in the Virginia court cannot be regarded
as special appearance merely to challenge jurisdiction. [As such,] she submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court and is bound by its determination that it had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.”).
243 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
244 Id. at 290
245 North Carolina’s criminal code provided as follows: “If any person, being married,
shall contract a marriage with any other person outside of this state . . . and shall
thereafter cohabit with such person in this state, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall
be punished as in cases of bigamy. See State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445 (1941) (quoting
statue).
238

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757669

Migratory Divorce

33

appearance is entitled to obligatory recognition in other states.”246 The
Court ruled that it was, and in the process overruled Haddock, which
according to the Court improperly relied upon the concept of marital
fault, or as the Court put it, “the legalistic notion that where one spouse
is wrongfully deserted he retains power over the matrimonial domicil so
that the domicil of the other spouse follows him wherever he may go,
while if he is to blame, he retains no such power.”247 Thus, Williams I
established that states are required to recognize ex parte divorces
obtained in a sister state whenever either party to the marriage
established domicile in the divorce granting state.
Importantly, however, North Carolina did not initially challenge the
defendants’ claims that they had indeed established a valid Nevada
domicile.248 As a result, after the Court’s holding in Williams I, North
Carolina once again prosecuted the couple for bigamy by rejecting the
validity of their Nevada domicile. The couple challenged their convictions
a second time, but this time the Supreme Court sided with North
Carolina. In what would come to be known as Williams II, the Court held
that a “[s]tate of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded,
even if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State.”249
According to the Court, “[t]he fact that the Nevada court found that they
were domiciled there is entitled to respect, and more. . . . But simply
because the Nevada court found that it had power to award a divorce
decree cannot . . . foreclose reexamination by another State.”250 Thus,
whereas Williams I gave the promise of clearer standards, Williams II
took that away by holding that a party could be divorced in one state (i.e.,
Nevada) yet still married in another (i.e., North Carolina).
For that reason, the Court’s holding in Williams II was controversial,
prompting vigorous dissents251 and posing particular difficulty for those
seeking migratory divorces. As Ann Estin explains:
After Williams II, a married individual who moved alone
246 See Estin, supra note 197, at 397 (quoting North Carolina’s brief in opposition to
the petition for grant of certiorari).
247 317 U.S. at 300 (“Whatever may be said as to the practical effect which such a
rule would have in clouding divorce decrees, the question as to where the fault lies has
no relevancy to the existence of state power in such circumstances.”).
248 See Estin, supra note 197, at 397-98 (noting that “the Nevada divorce decrees
were based on findings of domicile, and these findings had not been controverted in the
North Carolina proceeding”).
249 Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
250 Id. at 233-34.
251 Justice Rutledge, for instance, warned that “[o]nce again the ghost of ‘unitary
domicil’ returns on its perpetual round, in the guise of ‘jurisdictional fact,’ to upset
judgments, marriages, divorces, undermine the relations founded upon them, and make
this Court the unwilling and uncertain arbiter between the concededly valid laws and
decrees of sister states.”). Id. at 244 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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to a new state and made a home there could be divorced
in that state, without regard to the divorce law of the
“matrimonial domicile” and with little concern that the
divorce decree would be subject to challenge. For those
seeking a tourist divorce, however, Williams II
reintroduced the risk of complications.252

Thus, an unhappy spouse could venture to another state in search of
more favorable divorce laws, remain there long enough to meet its
domicil requirements, and yet still be prosecuted for bigamy upon
returning “home.” Of course, for those migratory divorces that were
uncontested, few if any problems would arise. And, indeed, the Supreme
Court would soon issue two decisions that made migratory divorce even
easier for those couples that mutually consented to the divorce.
The first case to do so was the 1948 decision in Sherrer v. Sherrer.253
There, Margaret Sherrer, who was married to Edward, left
Massachusetts for what was supposed to be a vacation in Florida. While
there, however, she decided to file for divorce after living in the state for
four months.254 Edward, who still lived in Massachusetts, nonetheless
participated in the divorce proceeding, denying the allegations.255 After
the divorce was granted, Margaret remarried and returned to
Massachusetts with her new husband.256 At that point, Edward
challenged the validity of the Florida divorce, and the Massachusetts
court agreed. Drawing upon Williams II, the court held that “full faith
and credit did not preclude the Massachusetts courts from reexamining
the finding of domicile made by the Florida court.”257 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed. It did so by noting that Edward had participated in
the Florida divorce.258 Thus, the Court distinguished the case from
Williams II and held that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Massachusetts was bound by the Florida decree.259 In so ruling, the Court
held that Edward had already received “his day in court with respect to
Estin, supra note 197, at 404.
334 U.S. 343 (1948).
254 Id. at 345.
255 Edward did contest the allegations that she had effectuated a Florida domicil, but
the Florida court rejected his arguments, and husband “failed to challenge the decree by
appeal.” Id. at 346.
256 Id. at 347.
257 Id. at 348.
258 Id. (“The respondent personally appeared in the Florida proceedings. Though his
attorney he filed pleadings denying the substantial allegations of petitioner's complaint.
It is not suggested that his rights to introduce evidence and otherwise to conduct his
defense were in any degree impaired.”).
259 According to the Court, “unlike the situation presented in [Williams II], the
finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts was made in proceedings in which the
defendant appeared and participated.” Id. at 349.
252
253
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every issue involved in the litigation, including the jurisdictional issue of
petitioner's domicile. Under such circumstances, there is nothing in the
concept of due process which demands that a defendant be afforded a
second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts.”260
Three years later the Court would hold that, in addition to the
spouses themselves, third parties were likewise foreclosed from
relitigating a foreign divorce in which both spouses had participated. In
Johnson v. Muelberger,261 the facts were somewhat similar to that of
Sherrer. E. Bruce Johnson lived in New York, but in 1942, his second
wife traveled to Florida to divorce him.262 It was apparently undisputed
that his wife did not satisfy Florida’s residency requirement; however,
neither party contested that fact, and the divorce was granted.263 Mr.
Johnson subsequently remarried. Upon his death in 1945, his daughter
from his first marriage learned that her inheritance would be reduced
based on the elective share that was due his third wife.264 The daughter
then sought to invalidate the Florida divorce in hopes of voiding her
father’s third marriage. The lower court sided with the daughter, holding
that the divorce decree bound only the parties to the marriage and that
his daughter was thus free to contest the divorce.265 The Supreme Court
disagreed and held that, because Florida law would not have permitted
the daughter to attack the divorce decree in that state, “it cannot be
attacked by them anywhere in the Union. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause forbids.”266 Taken together, Sherrer and Johnson establish that
lack of domicile is no bar to requiring a state to give full faith and credit
to a foreign divorce obtained by parties who consented to that court’s
jurisdiction.267
In the following years, the Court would introduce the concept of
divisible divorce, which in many ways represented “a compromise
between the interests of the spouse seeking an ex parte divorce and the
spouse who was absent from the proceeding.”268 Characterizing divorce
as divisible simply means that a particular state may not be able to
260

Id. at 348.

340 U.S. 581 (1951).
Id. at 582.
263 As the Court pointed out, “the undisputed facts as developed in the New York
Surrogate's hearing show that she did not comply with the jurisdictional ninety-day
residence requirement [but] the decedent appeared by attorney . . . not questioning the
allegations as to residence in Florida.” Id.
264 Id. at 583.
265 Id. at 583.
266 Id. at 589.
267 See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVORCE 159 (1955) (concluding that,
after Sherrer and Johnson, “the Supreme Court of the United States has given its
blessing to divorce by consent, so long as procedural formalities are complied with in the
divorce granting state”).
268 Estin, supra note 197, at 414.
261
262
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adjudicate all of the issues arising out of a divorce proceeding absent
jurisdiction over both parties.269 But, as developed in the cases discussed
above, the Supreme Court had already established that parties were free
to travel to sister states to obtain a divorce, and—if they either
established domicil there or their spouses consented to that court’s
jurisdiction—the resulting divorce would essentially be unassailable in
another state, including those states that only permitted divorce on the
narrowest grounds. Thus, the law of divorce had now become what an
editorial in Chicago’s Daily News aptly described as “the rule of the naval
convoy in reverse. The speed of the convoy is the speed of the slowest
ship; but from now on, the speed of divorce will tend to be that of the
fastest state.”270

B. Legislative Responses: Attempts to Nationalize Divorce
Over time, migratory divorce was no doubt seen as a blessing by
countless individuals who desired a divorce but were otherwise unable to
obtain one. For other Americans, however, the practice was a national
scandal with many going so far as to describe it as an “evil”271 or, in one
instance, a “mad race for sex freedom and return to paganism.”272 Among
those who shared such views, many of them turned to the legislature in
hopes of curing the problems posed by—in the words of one court writing
in 1859—“that large class of discontented or lecherous pilgrims seeking
the Mecca of divorce.”273 Thus, the purpose of this section is to chronicle
1) those reform proposals, which included both constitutional
amendments and uniform laws, and 2) the reason none of them—despite
repeated attempts—were able to garner sufficient support to become law.

See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957) (“Since the wife was not
subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right
which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband.”) As
the Court noted, “[i]t has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate
a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”
This concept of divisible divorce was first articulated by the Court in Estin v. Estin where
it held that a husband who obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada could not use the
existence of that divorce to avoid an alimony order his wife had obtained earlier in New
York. 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (“The result in this situation is to make the divorce
divisible—to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to
make it ineffective on the issue of alimony.”).
270 See Estin, supra note 197, at 401 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina: Editorial
Comment from the Lay Press, 29 A.B.A. J. 78 (1943)).
271 See infra notes 306-307 and accompanying text; see also W. O. Hart, Uniform
Divorce Laws, 28 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 137 (1923) (“The great evil in divorce suits is what is
known as the migratory divorce.”).
272 This Reno-vating Racket: An Editorial, THE RENO DIVORCE RACKET (1931), at 3.
273 McQuigg v. McQuigg, 13 Ind. 294, 313 (1859).
269
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1. Proposals to Amend the Constitution
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt implored Congress to amend
the Constitution to provide federal control over the laws of marriage and
divorce. From the words he used, it is clear the President viewed
migratory divorce as a problem that demanded such an extraordinary
step:
I am well aware of how difficult it is to pass a
constitutional amendment. Nevertheless . . . [a]t present
the wide differences in the laws of the different States on
this subject result in scandals and abuses; and surely
there is nothing so vitally essential to the welfare of the
nation, nothing around which the nation should so bend
itself to throw every safeguard, as the home life of the
average citizen.274
Five years later, a young state senator from New York named Franklin
D. Roosevelt, would make a similar argument when he introduced a
resolution supporting “the adoption of . . . an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, delegating to Congress power to
establish uniform laws on the subject of married persons throughout the
United States.”275 In so doing, Roosevelt expressed the opinion that “the
divorce laws of Nevada and some other Western states are too lax.”276
During the decades in which migratory divorce flourished, such calls
for reform were constant.277 In response, between the years 1884 and
1963, Congress would propose over seventy-five constitutional
amendments aimed at nationalizing the law of divorce.278 Consider, for
instance, the proposed 1921 amendment, which is emblematic of the form
these various proposals typically took: “The Congress shall have power
to establish uniform laws on the subject of marriage and divorce from the
bonds of matrimony throughout the United States.”279 Other proposals
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 146.
Id.
276 Id. at 147.
277 See Carriere, supra note 20, at 1743 (“Migratory divorce's many harms provided
274
275

an impetus for two centuries of divorce reform, both conservative and liberal.”).
278 See generally Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the
United States Constitution regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 611, 666 (2004)
(compiling all proposed amendments regarding marriage to the U.S. Constitution,
including those “relating to the evasion of state marriage or divorce laws” as well as those
“relating to Congress's jurisdiction over divorce”); see also RILEY, supra note 36, at 111
(“[B]eginning in 1884, at every session of Congress, members considered motions
suggesting that the Constitution be amended.”)
279 Id. at 681 (citing H.R.J. Res. 83, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.).
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attempted to go further and grant Congress even greater authority over
domestic relations. For instance, a 1923 proposed amendment provided
that “[t]he Congress shall have power to make laws, which shall be
uniform throughout the United States, on marriage and divorce, the
legitimation of children, and the care and custody of children affected by
divorce.”280
Some proposals were motivated not only by migratory divorce but
other societal concerns pertaining to the law of marriage within the
United States at that time. For instance, a number of amendments
outlawing polygamy were proposed over the years, and several of those
included language that would likewise federalize divorce jurisdiction. For
example, an 1887 proposal provided that: “Congress shall have power to
legislate upon the subjects of marriage and divorce by general laws
applicable alike to all the States and Territories, and neither bigamy nor
polygamy shall exist or be permitted within the United States or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.”281 Similarly, the subject of interracial
marriage made an appearance in at least one of these amendments.
Namely, a 1928 proposed amendment seemingly grew out of concerns
involving not only migratory divorce, but also fears that the Fourteenth
Amendment might be interpreted to prohibit state restrictions on
interracial marriage:
The Congress shall have power to make laws, which shall
be uniform throughout the United States, on marriage
and divorce, the legitimation of children, and the care
and custody of children affected by annulment of
marriage or by divorce, but the power to legislate
concerning the relation between persons of different
races is hereby reserved to and may be exercised by the
several States.282
Finally, an 1899 proposal seemed designed to not only give Congress the
power to regulate divorce, but to establish a religious affiliation for the
entire nation: “The Congress, as the highest law-making power of a
Christian nation, shall have exclusive power to regulate marriage and
divorce in the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia.”283
Despite the number of proposed amendments, none garnered
sufficient support to come up for a vote, and very few even received

See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 149.
Stein, supra note 278, at 669 (citing S.J.Res.2, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1877)).
282 Id. at 683 (citing H.R.J. Res. 162, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928)).
283 Id. at 673 (citing S.J. Res. 40, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1899)).
280
281
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hearings.284 Multiple reasons exist for this failure. First, there was
concern that giving Congress control over marriage and divorce would
simply make it too difficult for individuals to obtain a divorce.285 Over the
years a growing number of people had started to recognize the value of
divorce.286 For women, in particular, divorce had come to be seen
increasingly as a “solution to problems posed by desertion, spousal abuse,
or the laws of coverture.”287 Thus, many viewed “the divorce mills [as]
providing a needed service by countering the unjust laws that prohibited
individuals from exiting destructive unions in their home states.”288
Second, many conservatives feared that whatever rules Congress came
up with regarding divorce, they likely would not be as restrictive as those
currently operating in some states, thus forcing some states to adopt
more liberal divorce laws. After all, during much of this time, New York
still only permitted divorce on the grounds of adultery,289 and South
Carolina did not permit divorce at all between the years of 1878 and
1949.290 Although it was the “archaic laws”291 of states like these that
many believed were driving migratory divorce by incentivizing their
citizens to seek divorces elsewhere,292 the same states were nonetheless
opposed to any attempt by Congress to force them to relax those
restrictions. As one representative from South Carolina said, “Why
should we be forced to lower our standard of morality because you want
to raise yours?”293
The final impediment to adopting a Constitutional amendment
See RILEY, supra note 36, at 111 (noting that none of the proposed amendments
ever “garnered enough support to come to a vote”).
285 Id. at 118 (noting the fear many had that “restricted divorce provisions . . . would
hurt wives by reducing the ease of divorce, thus forcing wives to remain in harmful
marriages”). This point was particularly relevant when it came to a constitutional
amendment given that “[a]n amendment of this nature would interfere with the privacy
of the individual and the right of citizens to make decisions about their personal lives.”
Id. at 111.
286 See Barber, supra note 10, at 68 (“To many Americans, the increasing availability
and frequency of divorce was a sign of emancipation, not regression.”). Consider, for
instance, the words of William E. Carson, writing in 1915: “[I]t is clear that divorce is not
in itself a disease, but is a remedy for a disease.” WILLIAM E. CARSON, THE MARRIAGE
REVOLT: A STUDY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 461 (1915) (noting that “the increase of
divorce is, in reality, a healthy sign, proving, as it does, that people have become less
tolerant of evils which were once endured and for which divorce is the only remedy”).
287 Estin, supra note 197, at 390. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for instance, wrote in 1902
that “[t]he states that have more liberal divorce laws are for women today what Canada
was for the fugitive in the old days of slavery.” See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 150-51.
288 BARBER, supra note 10, at 68.
289 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
291 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 143.
292 See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
293 DiFonzo, supra note 73, at 920.
284
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regarding divorce was general concerns regarding state sovereignty. As
expressed by an 1897 editorial in the New York Times, “a constitutional
amendment would be ‘contrary to the whole theory of the constitution
and subversive of the principles upon which the distinction between
State and Federal jurisdiction is founded.”294 Although some were
inspired by the positive benefits that had accrued as a result of the
Reconstruction Amendments,295 which had likewise diminished states’
rights, “most Congressmen felt that the situation was not grave enough
to justify increasing the power of the federal government at the expense
of the states.”296
As such, the last proposal to amend the Constitution to protect
against migratory divorce would come in 1963, providing that “[t]he laws
of the State, territory, Commonwealth or possession of the United States
in which a marriage is contracted shall be the controlling law in any
proceeding for the dissolution of such marriage instituted in any other
State . . . .”297 Like all such proposals that had come before it, it never
even came up for a vote.298
2. Attempts to Create Uniform Legislation
Divorce reformers were by no means ignorant of the challenges
associated with any attempt to amend the Constitution.299 As a result,
contemporaneous with those attempts were efforts aimed at voluntary
action among the states, specifically regarding uniform legislation
prescribing divorce jurisdiction. In fact, as one commentator describes,
“uniformity was the single most talked about solution to the divorce
problem.”300 Leading that charge was New York, the state which
stubbornly maintained only one ground for divorce301 and,
correspondingly, from which many residents, traveled to sister states to

294 WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 248 (1967); see also RILEY,
supra note 36, at 111 (“[D]efenders of states’ rights also saw national divorce legislation
as a threat to states’ long-standing regulation of the marital status of their citizens.”).
295 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 133 (“Having altered the Federal balance through
the enactment of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, many
Republicans were hospitable to the idea of adding still another constitutional amendment
that would permit Congress to legislate in the field of marriage and divorce.”).
296 O’NEILL, supra note 294, at 240.
297 Stein, supra note 278, at 684 (H.R.J. Res. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)).
298 Id.; see also supra note 284, and accompanying text.
299 See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 141 (describing how reformers thought “all efforts to
secure the passage of a constitutional amendment to be ‘futile’”).
300 O’NEILL, supra note 294, at 252; see also PARKMAN, supra note 177, at 17 (“The
increased use of migratory divorce . . . created pressures for uniform laws throughout the
United States.”).
301 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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obtain a divorce.302 In 1889, New York Governor David B. Hill called upon
the legislature to create a “Commission for the Promotion of Uniform
Legislation in the United States.”303 Other states followed suit, and soon
the various commissions would join forces, becoming the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.304
The aim was to promulgate a uniform code relating to divorce that a
large number of states would adopt and, thus, “bring laws into greater
harmony so as to eliminate the attraction of divorce migration.”305 The
first such proposal by the National Conference came in 1900 when it
issued a model statute intended to “attack[] directly, and . . . effectively,
three of the greatest evils, considered from a legal standpoint, of the
present condition of our various and conflicting divorce laws.”306 The first
such “evil” was “the scandal of migratory divorces,”307 and indeed the text
suggests that much of the proposal was aimed at making such divorces
more difficult to obtain:
Section. 1. No divorce shall be granted for any cause
arising prior to the residence of the complainant or
defendant in this State, which was not a ground for
divorce in the State where the cause arose.
Sec. 2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any
cause arising in this State, who has not had actual
residence in this State for at least one year next before
bringing suit for divorce, with a bona fide intention of
making this State his or her permanent home.
Section 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any
cause arising out of this State unless the complainant or
defendant shall have resided within this State for at least
302 See, e.g., BLAKE, supra note 11, at 171 (“In 1935, it was estimated that transients
from New York and New Jersey were the parties in about three-fifths of Nevada’s divorce
cases.”).
303 RILEY, supra note 36, at 111.
304 Riley points out that “the governors of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Michigan had appointed state commissions to study uniform divorce
legislation.” Id. at 112. In addition, Blake notes that, “by 1898, a total of thirty-two states
and one territory were cooperating in the movement.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 137.
305 PHILLIPS, supra note 33, at 161.

Tenth Annual Conference of State Commissioners for the Promotion of Uniformity
of Legislation in the United States, 10 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
306

COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING 5, 45 (1900).
307 Id. Second was “the wrong of speedy decrees against absent defendants, who may
be Ignorant of any suit pending” and third was “the Interstate confusion arising from
some few states forbidding remarriage, while a great majority of the states permit it.” Id.
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two years next before bringing suit for divorce, with a
bona fide intention of making this State his or her
permanent home.308

This first proposal dealt only with divorce jurisdiction and not the
grounds upon which states should condition a grant of divorce.309 When
it came to that question, the National Conference would not attempt to
provide an answer until several years later. The problem was the
delegates’ inability to agree on what form a uniform divorce standard
should take. When they first met in Washington in 1906, it appeared they
did agree on quite a few issues: “a two-year residency requirement;
personal notification of a defendant rather than notification by
publication; public divorce hearings; and a one-year ban on
remarriage.”310 On the subject of divorce grounds, however, discussions
broke down.311 After all, although the primary goal was to encourage
more liberal states to become more restrictive when it came to permitting
divorce, a model law would simultaneously require the most restrictive
states to become more permissive.312 As an editorial from the New York
Tribune in 1906 put it: “States which have strict laws will hardly relax
them so as to recognize six causes in place of one cause for divorce.”313
Those states knew that, if they did relax their requirements for obtaining
a divorce, they would see a rise in their divorce rate—a result thought
“too dear a price to pay for uniformity.”314
In the end, the delegates seemingly compromised by recognizing six
grounds, but carefully pointing out that, while those six “seem to be in
accordance with the legislation of a large number of [states], this
Congress, desiring to see the number of causes reduced rather than
increased, recommends that no additional causes should be recognized in
308
309

Id. at 44.
See Grossman, supra note 21, at 96 (noting how the 1900 proposal “purported to

deal only with divorce procedure”) (internal quotations omitted).
310 RILEY, supra note 36, at 117.
311 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 141-42 (describing the numerous disagreements that
emerged from proposals regarding the permissive grounds for divorce); PHILLIPS, supra
note 80, at 469 (noting how the delegates “found it impossible to agree on a single divorce
code that was acceptable to all the states”).
312 As Ann Estin explains:
States with restrictive policies on divorce, armed with a series of powerful moral and
political arguments, had strong incentives to articulate and defend those policies in the
competition with other states over regulation of individual families. Other states, with
different moral and political views of divorce and different economic interests or
demographics, proved equally unwilling to yield.
Estin, supra note 197, at 419.
313 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 145.
314 O’NEILL, supra note 294, at 247-48.
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any state.”315 Further, in reference to the more conservative divorce
states like New York and South Carolina, the report concluded that “in
those states where causes are restricted, no change is called for.”316
When it came to when one state must recognize a divorce issued by a
sister state, the model statute read as follows:
Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this
state to a decree of annulment of marriage or divorce by
a court of competent jurisdiction in another State,
territory or possession of the United States when the
jurisdiction of such court was obtained in the manner and
in substantial conformity with the conditions prescribed
in . . . this act . . . Provided, that if any inhabitant of this
state shall go into another state, territory or country in
order to obtain a decree of divorce for a cause which
occurred while the parties resided in this State, or for a
cause which is note ground for divorce under the laws of
this state, a decree so obtained shall be of no force or
effect in this state.317
In fashioning such a proposal, nobody thought it realistic to expect
divorce mill states to embrace any law that would make it more difficult
to grant divorces. As one critic of the push for uniform state laws put it,
“not in a thousand years could you move some of those Western States to
reform their divorce laws.”318 Even so, the proposal was even less
successful than hoped, and ultimately only three states adopted it.319
Just as religion had earlier influenced each state’s approach to
divorce,320 it likewise posed a significant obstacle when it came to
achieving uniformity. Around the turn of the twentieth century, a
number of religious leaders became actively involved in the uniform law
movement:

See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2120 (1991). The
six causes were “adultery, bigamy, conviction of felony, intolerable cruelty, willful
desertion for two years, and habitual drunkenness.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 142.
316 White, supra note 315, at 2120.
317 Report of the Committee on Marriage and Divorce, 17 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 120, 129-30 (1907)
318 O’NEILL, supra note 294, at 247.
319 White, supra note 315, at 2107. As White points out, the states were Delaware,
New Jersey, and Wisconsin. Id.
320 See supra Part II.A.; see also Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to
Sever the Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1997) (“Given that settlers in different
parts of the country had different religious backgrounds, the grounds available for divorce
varied significantly from state to state.”).
315

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757669

44

Migratory Divorce
Episcopal Bishop William C. Doane of Albany, a strong
supporter of New York’s strict divorce law, spearheaded
the organization of an Inter-Church Conference on
Marriage and Divorce that met in 1903 and included
representatives from approximately twenty-five religious
denominations. In 1904, the New York Times reported
that the American Baptist Home Mission Society had
joined the growing list of religious groups favoring
uniform divorce law. In 1905, the New York Tribune
noted that Bishop Doane and a group of representatives
from the Inter-Church Conference had urged President
Theodore Roosevelt to lend his support to the law of
legislative change.321

The problem, however, was that the different religions were just as
incapable as the states in agreeing upon what was acceptable when it
came to divorce. As one commentator describes: “The campaign for
voluntary uniformity, although widely applauded, was doomed from the
start because different religious groups with differing ideas on divorce
dominated enough state legislatures to prevent the passage of model
laws.”322
Nonetheless, the calls for uniformity continued. Indeed, “[w]henever
some dramatic episode focused attention on the migratory divorce
problem, newspaper editorial writers would deplore the fact that there
was no uniform national law of marriage and divorce.”323 After
unsuccessful proposals in 1928 and 1930,324 the National Conference
scored its biggest success in 1947 when it passed The Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, the provisions of which attempted to incorporate the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Williams I and Williams II:325
Section 1: A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction
shall be of no force or effect in this state if both parties to
the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the
proceeding for the divorce was commenced.
Section 2:

Proof that a person hereafter obtaining a

RILEY, supra note 36, at 114.
O’NEILL, supra note 294, at 253.
323 BLAKE, supra note 11, at 133.
324 See Grossman, supra note 21, at 97. For instance, the 1930 proposal provided
“that no court would exercise divorce jurisdiction unless both parties were domiciled in
the state in which the court was located or, if only one party was, then the domicile must
have continued for one uninterrupted year prior to filing for divorce.” Id.
325 Id. at 100 (“The 1947 Uniform Divorce Recognition Act reflected the approach in
the two Williams opinions.”).
321
322

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757669

Migratory Divorce

45

divorce from the bonds of matrimony in another
jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within 12
months before the commencement of the proceeding
therefor, and resumed residence in this state within 18
months after the date of the person's departure
therefrom, or (b) at all times after the person's departure
from this state and until the person's return maintained
a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie
evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when
the divorce proceeding was commenced.326
Even then, however, the proposed statute was only adopted in nine
states,327 and those states rarely relied upon it.328 In fact, the National
Conference would ultimately withdraw the proposal “due to it being
obsolete.”329
In the end, the 1947 proposal would be the final model statute on
divorce jurisdiction put forth. Of course, as outlined above,330 the
Supreme Court by that time had largely settled the constitutional
standards regarding state recognition of foreign divorce decrees and,
thus, there existed considerably less space within which state laws on
that topic could operate.
IV. LASTING IMPACTS
Although migratory divorce may have come to an end in the late
1960s, its impact on the law of domestic relations continues to this very
day. It is the position of this Article, in fact, that in many ways the
migratory divorce era represents a watershed period in the development
of contemporary family law—one that courts, policy makers, and
contemporary family law scholars must be mindful of as they confront a
number of contemporary issues affecting families. Particularly relevant
are the complex social, legal, and political influences that contributed to
326

See Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 23 CONN. B.J. 98, 122 (1949) (quoting

proposal).

See William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Linda A. Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L.
327

REV. 1363, 1400 (1967) (“The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, framed to discourage
rather than encourage migration in pursuit of divorce, has been adopted by only nine
states”) (internal quotations omitted).
328 See, e.g., In Dietrich v. Dietrich, 261 P.2d 269 (1953) (holding that, despite the
language of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, that defendant was estopped from
asserting the invalidity of the plaintiff's Nevada divorce given that the defendant married
the plaintiff in California the day following the Nevada decree).
329 See 9 (Part 1B) U.L.A. (Master Ed.), p. 3
330 See supra Part III.A.
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the phenomenon of migratory divorce as well as the responses that either
failed or ultimately proved successful in addressing the resulting legal
questions. In order to illustrate the role this history continues to play in
the law of domestic relations, this Part looks at four themes found in
contemporary family law debates, noting the connections each shares
with migratory divorce in general and also identifying some of the
specific legal inquiries currently taking place that may benefit from a
greater understanding of this historical period. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article to posit solutions to all those contemporary debates,
it is hoped that by drawing these connections to migratory divorce, those
actively engaged in those debates will utilize this history to more
effectively advance viable solutions to those problems.

A. Individual Rights v. States’ Rights
Writing in 1881, the Supreme Court described state power concerning
the law of domestic relations as follows: “The State . . . has absolute right
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved.”331 One consequence of the migratory divorce cases, however,
was to forever alter that balance.332 Consider, for instance, Justice
Black’s 1945 dissent in Williams II, where he noted that the
“Constitution preserves an area of individual freedom which the state
has no right to abridge.”333 For that reason, Black disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion that North Carolina could second-guess Nevada’s
adjudication of domicile, noting that “[t]he flavor of the Court's opinion
is that a state has supreme power to control its domiciliaries' conduct
wherever they go and that the state may prohibit them from getting a
divorce in another state.”334 As such, Black criticized the majority opinion
as resting on “a restriction of individual as opposed to state rights.”335
Although only a minority view at the time of the two Williams cases,
one of the lasting legacies of migratory divorce and the Supreme Court
cases it spawned is the idea that divorce is not so much an issue of state
sovereignty but is more so one of individual rights. As Ann Estin
explains, those cases “resolved a long-standing federalism problem by
redefining the scope of state power over marital status . . ., fundamentally
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1881).
See Estin, supra note 197, at 381 (noting how the migratory divorce cases
“fundamentally altered state power over the family be extending to individuals greater
control over their marital status”).
333 Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 267 n.8 (Black, J., dissenting).
331
332

334
335

Id.
Id. In the words of Justice Black, “[t]he fact that two people will be deprived of

their constitutional rights impels me to protest as vigorously as I can against affirmance
of these convictions.” Id. at 262.
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alter[ing] state power over the family by extending to individuals greater
control over their marital status.”336 Thus, whereas family law was once
considered to be entirely an issue of state control,337 there now existed a
“growing emphasis on privacy and individual rights.”338 Indeed, looking
at the migratory divorce cases, the Court’s earliest decisions focused
much more on the states’ right to control the marital status of their
citizens.339 By the end, however, “marital status had become an aspect of
personhood, and the right to change that status became a privilege of
national citizenship.”340 Consider, for instance, the Sherrer and Johnson
decisions,341 which in essence permitted divorce by mutual consent of the
parties.342 By 1971, the Supreme Court would go even further,
characterizing divorce proceedings as “the adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship.”343
The impact of that shift lives on today and has spawned a whole host
of complex questions regarding the family. First, as one commentator
explains, “[g]reater solicitude for individual prerogatives in the area of
family relations can be identified in the Court's post-Williams II
decisions, which base personal jurisdiction for custody and child support
actions on in personam jurisdiction instead of domicile.”344 But such
reverberations extend much further than simply the incidences of legal
divorce. In the decades that followed, the Supreme Court would begin
focusing on the personal liberty interests at play in various aspects of
domestic relations law. In the process, the law of the family, which had
once been seen as entirely the province of state law, would become
increasingly subject to constitutional constraints. Consider, for instance,
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut345 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,346 which
Estin, supra note 197, at 381.
Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State: American Family Law in
Historical Perspective, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 648 (1992) (describing how the law once
“viewed families as instruments of the state”).
338 Id. at 636.
339 See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 31, (1903) (holding that, to say
Massachusetts was require to recognize the foreign divorce would undermine the
“authority of the state of Massachusetts to legislate over a subject inherently domestic in
its nature and upon which the existence of civilized society depends.”); see also Sumner,
supra note 3, at 2 (noting how those cases seemingly evinced “greater concern over the
states’ interests than there was with the desires, rights and status of individuals”).
340 Estin, supra note 197, at 425.
341 See supra notes 253-266 and accompanying text.
342 Estin, supra note 197, at 409 (describing how the two cases “appeared to have
ratified” the understanding “that despite the stringencies of the law on the books, the law
in fact offered opportunities for couples to divorce by mutual agreement”).
343 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
344 Nick Tarasen, Untangling the Knot: Finding A Forum for Same-Sex Divorces in
the State of Celebration, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1585, 1612 (2011).
345 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
346 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
336
337
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ruled unconstitutional state restrictions on contraception. In turn, those
cases gave rise to a fundamental right to privacy,347 upon which the Court
would subsequently build in Roe v. Wade348 and Lawrence v. Texas349 to
strike down abortion restrictions and laws criminalizing sodomy,
respectively. During this time, the Court would likewise recognize other
fundamental rights in the realm of family law, including parents’ rights
to direct the upbringing of their children350 and the right to marry the
person of one’s choice.351
In many respects, then, the phenomenon of migratory divorce opened
the door to the law of domestic relations taking on increasing
constitutional dimensions, and it is that legacy with which the law must
continue to wrestle today. One aspect in particular that continues to fuel
these difficult questions is the Court’s willingness to decouple family law
protections from overly formalistic state definitions of “family.” As one
commentator has described, “the new notions of privacy, sexual equality
and children’s rights produced a revolution in American family law”—
one that has prompted “a gradual erosion in the traditional conception of
the nuclear family as a legal entity with its own rights.”352 Consider for
instance, Eisenstadt, where the Court held that the right to
contraception likewise encompasses unmarried individuals,353 or Levy v.
Louisiana, where the Court began to strike down state laws that
discriminated against nonmarital children.354
Building on these
precedents, both courts and scholars continue to address related
questions of whether and to what extent family law protections should
extend to those who fail to satisfy the legal definitions of “spouse” or
“child.” For example, a number of legal commentators are engaged with
questions involving whether cohabitants are, despite not being married,
347 See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77
(1985) (describing the right of privacy as being “recognized and protected in” Griswold
and Eisenstadt”).
348 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
349 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
350 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.”).
351 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015) (“There is dignity in
the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to
make such profound choices.”).
352 Mintz, supra note 337, at 653.
353 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (“[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to
contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married
alike.”).
354 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no
relation” to the right at issue).
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nonetheless entitled to family law protections.355 Others are engaged
with the complicated question of whether a person is entitled to the
constitutional protections afforded parents when that person is neither
the child’s biological nor adoptive parent.356
Beyond expanding family law protections to those who might not
have traditionally qualified as “family,” there is the related question of
whether those who already meet those definitions might nonetheless be
entitled to greater rights than have historically been recognized.
Consider for instance the question of whether children might enjoy
constitutional rights independent of their parents’ wishes and directives.
The Supreme Court decisions in the context of abortion suggest that the
answer is yes,357 but there are some who argue that children enjoy
individual rights that extend even further.358 Similarly, the degree to
which grandparents might enjoy constitutional protections vis-à-vis their
grandchildren is a question that the Supreme Court has explored but

355 See e.g., Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017)
(calling “for moving beyond the marriage-nonmarriage dyad in allocating property rights
between individuals who are not, or have not been, married”); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura,
A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1512 (2016) (noting that “states have
routinely responded to the legalization of same-sex marriage by eliminating their
nonmarital statuses” and discussing the harms that have resulted); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What About
Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?, 41 ACTEC L.J. 49, 50 (2015) (arguing that
“cohabiting couples whose relationship shows that they are (or were) deeply committed
to one another [should be treated] as married in fact”).
356 See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483,
1491 (2018) (arguing “for a definition of constitutional parenthood that accounts not only
for those who share a biological connection to the child, but also those who were the
intended parents of the resulting child, regardless of biology”); Douglas NeJaime, The
Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261 (2020) (challenging “the conventional
assumption that the Constitution protects only biological parent-child relationships and
makes an affirmative case for constitutional protection for nonbiological parents”); David
D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 857, 860 (2006) (“[T]he circumstances that enabled the law's tidy assumptions linking
parenthood with biology and adoption have collapsed.”).
357 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899
(1992) (“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is
an adequate judicial bypass procedure.”).
358 See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127
YALE L.J. 1448, 1453 (2018) (arguing for, what the authors describe as “a direct departure
from existing constitutional law,” a new approach to children’s rights which “would
recognize children's affirmative rights as children to certain goods and services essential
to furthering their broader interests”); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The

Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 362 (1994) (arguing “that the law should accord children
an independent liberty interest in their relationships with both ‘legal parents’ and
‘nonlegal parents’ irrespective of biological ties”);
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never answered.359 As contemporary legal minds continue analyzing
these and related questions, it is helpful to remember that the story of
migratory divorce. Given the impetus it provided for recognizing the
constitutional dimensions afforded individual members of a “family” and
the resulting doctrines that flow from such recognition, that era provides
a number of invaluable tools for analyzing these contemporary tensions
between family law and individual rights.

B. Societal Evolution, Self-Correction, and Enduring Harm
One of the biggest influences behind the rise in migratory divorce was
quite simply the fact many states refused to provide the legal remedy
that their citizens long for.360 Specifically, divorce became more socially
acceptable once people realized the advantages that came from dissolving
marriages that were broken.361 Thus, when they could not obtain the
relief that they desired in their home states, people naturally began to
look for relief elsewhere. Thus, as one judge, writing in 1942, would
characterize it, those who traveled to other states in search of divorce
were simply “the victims of a legal system of divorce at war with social
convention.”362 And, after decades of debating the social desirability of
migratory divorce and countless attempts to curb it, the practice instead
ended as a result of—in the words of Joanna Grossman—“a social
movement that perhaps unexpectedly produced virtually uniform laws of
divorce: the no-fault revolution. The revolution did not come about
because of the desire for uniformity; uniformity, rather, was an
unintended byproduct of a percolating demand for easier, less costly, and
more honest divorce.”363
The lesson to be derived here is that the law of domestic relations is
essentially driven to by the public’s evolving conceptions of family, and
to the extent the law is slow to recognize such change, societal forces will
eventually force a self-correction. In this regard, migratory divorce was
certainly not the last example of this phenomenon. Consider for instance
the degree to which the law completely reversed course when it came to
359 In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court ruled against grandparents seeking
greater visitation on the basis that the Washington statute upon which they relied was
overly broad. 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000). The Court, however, explicitly did not address
the question of “whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition
precedent to granting visitation.” Id. at 73.
360 See Garfield, supra note 19, at 504 (describing migratory divorce as “a predictable
consequence of overly restrictive divorce laws”); see also supra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 286-288 and accompanying text.
362 Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
363 Grossman, supra note 21, at 100.
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the legality of prenuptial agreements. Originally dismissed as violative
of public policy, courts were unwilling to enforce any such agreements
that contemplated the possibility of divorce.364 However, as social
acceptance for cohabitation rose and—at the same time—people became
increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of control spouses had regarding
property division at divorce, more couples opted to forego marriage and
not risk the financial consequences that would follow a divorce.365 In
response, courts soon began taking a different position. Given the states’
interest in encouraging marriage,366 courts in the early 70s began
upholding the agreements.367 Today such agreements are permitted in
every state.368
To point out that family law will eventually catch up with the reality
of American lives is hardly revolutionary; however, that is not the point.
Instead, the principle to be gleaned from the example set by migratory
divorce is that family law must be vigilant when it comes to recognizing
areas in which it is out of sync. After all, the fact that the law will
eventually self-correct is of little comfort to those who are adversely
impacted by the law prior to that rectification. Consider for instance the
plaintiffs in Williams who were ultimately sentenced to prison terms
simply by virtue of having received a divorce in Nevada.369 More
generally, consider those who were trapped in broken marriages because
364 Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150 (1998)

(“Until the mid-1970s, most American courts held that premarital agreements and other
contracts made “in contemplation of divorce” were unenforceable as against public
policy.”).
365 See, e.g., Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 896 (1997) (describing how “[i]f previously married
individuals can't contract to avoid the most unpleasant aspects of divorce, they might
simply choose not to get married”); Carolyn Counce, Family Law-Cary v. Cary:
Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV.
1041, 1047 (1997) (pointing out that “the once prevalent societal constraints on living
together without marriage have largely disappeared,” and thus, couples might not marry
“if they had no means of limiting the extent of their liability”).
366 See Matsumura, supra note 355, at 1156 (noting the “state's interest in
encouraging marriage”).
367 The first court credited with doing so is the Supreme Court of Florida. See Posner
v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970). Other states soon followed Florida’s lead. See
Stephen T. Gary, To Agree or Not to Agree: Treatment of Postnuptial Agreements Under
Oklahoma Law, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 779, 784 (2011) (listing cases).
368 See Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 229, 255 (1994) (noting that “[a]ll states recognize, to some extent, the
enforceability of premarital agreements”).
369 Fortunately, the couple whose Nevada marriage gave rise to William I and
William II apparently escaped punishment. A story in Life magazine from 1945 reported
that the two “were granted a reprieve by the state on condition that they remarry in
North Carolina,” which they did in August of 1945. Fred Rodell, Divorce Muddle, LIFE,
Sept. 3, 1945, at 90.
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their states essentially denied them the opportunity to obtain a divorce
and a migratory divorce was not an economically feasible option. Similar
harms would have befallen those who, prior to the time states changed
their minds about prenuptial agreements, entered into a marriage
thinking they were protected by a contract that was ultimately deemed
unenforceable. Or, for a more contemporary example, there were
countless same-sex relationships that never obtained the protections of
marriage simply because those relationships ended—either through
death or informal dissolution—while awaiting the legalization of samesex marriage.370
Such considerations are important because there are currently a
number of legal issues relating to family law that arise from the law’s
failure to recognize evolving norms. To name but two are the laws
relating to cohabitating couples and those relating to parentage. In terms
of cohabitation, couples who once lived with one another outside of
marriage did so at great peril given that the law refused to afford them
any rights or remedies vis-à-vis one another.371 Although California in
the 1970s opened the door for cohabitants to enter into enforceable
agreements regarding property distribution,372 most states continue to
deny meaningful protections to unmarried cohabitants. Indeed, a few
states refuse to permit any recovery whatsoever373 and, even among those
that do, almost all condition recovery on the existence of a contract—a
formality few cohabitating couples would think to undertake.374 This
inertia on the law’s part might not be so concerning were it not for the
drastic increase in cohabitation over the last few decades.375 Thus,
370 See Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives and the Law of
Nonmarriage, 129 YALE L.J. F. 1 (2019).
371 Elizabeth Hodges, Will You "Contractually" Marry Me?, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.

LAW. 385, 398 (2010) (“[H]istorically cohabitation has had a negative connotation both
socially and legally.”).
372 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976) (holding that 1) express
contracts between cohabitants regarding property distribution were enforceable so long
as they were not conditioned “upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious
sexual services” and 2) in the absence of an express agreement, recovery was likewise
permitted on the basis of implied contract and other equitable remedies).
373 See Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 2020
(2018) (“Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana seem to go further, rejecting any claim arising
from a cohabitant relationship.”).
374 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 262 (2004) (describing the “contract-based”
approach as the “default framework”).
375 For instance, U.S. Census data reveals that not only did the number of
cohabitating couples increased seventy-two percent between 1990 and 2000, see
Christopher Marquis, Total of Unmarried Couples Surged in 2000 U.S. Census, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at A22, but it increased an additional forty-one percent between
2000 and 2010. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILIES:
2010, at 5 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
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“[d]espite the growing prevalence and cultural acceptance of this form of
household, and wide-ranging support for providing a more diverse menu
of family-configuration choices beyond just marriage, legal protections
for unmarried cohabitants are limited and largely stagnant.”376 In terms
of parentage, a number of scholars have pointed out the mismatch that
currently exists when it comes to how the law limits legal parenthood to
biological and adoptive parents.377 After all, with advances in assisted
reproduction, the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the increased
frequency of divorce, remarriage and cohabitation, states now regularly
encounter claims of parental identity that thirty years ago would have
been unimaginable.378 Yet a number of states have ignored the need for
more nuanced laws regarding legal parentage, and even among those
that have made some changes, rights and protections vary greatly from
state to state.379
These are but two examples of contemporary family law debates that
stem from the laws’ failure to adjust to the new reality of American lives.
Looking at the lessons gleaned from the history of migratory divorce,
lawmakers would be wise to recognize that societal forces will almost
always force a self-correction; however, the longer the delay, the greater
the number of lives and relationships that will be forever harmed. In the
context of domestic relations law, such harm is particularly salient given
that the states’ obligation to protect individuals is one of family law’s
“most basic duties,”380 and in the words of Carl Schneider who is credited
with describing this “protective function” of family law, doing so requires
“protecting people from physical harm, as the law of spouse and child
abuse attempts to do, and from non-physical harms, especially economic
wrongs and psychological injuries.”381

C. Full Faith and Credit’s Limitations on State Exceptionalism

376 Chapter Three Restitution at Home: Unjust Compensation for Unmarried
Cohabitants' Domestic Labor, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2124 (2020); see also supra note 355 and

accompanying text.

377 See supra note 356; see also Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 649, 656 (2008) (suggesting “that it is

important to distill out the different attributes of bionormativity in order to balance the
competing priorities that inform a conceptualization of parenthood”); Ayelet BlecherPrigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 119, 145 (2018) (arguing that
“relationships should be considered together with both intent and biology” in determining
legal parentage).
378 See Higdon, supra note 356, at 1486 (“These changes have raised a number of
questions that, 30 years ago, would have been unheard of.”).
379 Id. at 1483.
380 Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495, 497 (1992).
381 Id. (emphasis added).
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One of the most enduring lessons of the migratory divorce era was the
degree to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause effectively limits a
state’s ability to refuse recognition of a divorce decree issued by a sister
state.382 Consider, for instance, an early Massachusetts’ statute aimed at
refusing enforcement of migratory divorces:
A divorce decreed in another state or country according
to the laws thereof, by a court having jurisdiction of the
cause and of both the parties, shall be valid and effectual
in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this
commonwealth goes into another state or country to
obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here, while
the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not
authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a
divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this
commonwealth.383
Although the Supreme Court would side with Massachusetts in 1903 on
its ability to legislate in this manner,384 the Court was forced to revisit
the issue as the constitutional questions arising from migratory divorce
proved more complex. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would rule that
any state could dissolve the marital status of one who was domiciled
there, resulting in a divorce decree that sister states were
constitutionally required to recognize.385 In light of the Supreme Court’s
evolving jurisprudence on that issue, states were forced to accept that,
realistically, they had very little power when it came to defining what
sorts of divorces they would accept.
Similar debates concerning full faith and credit are playing out
today. For example, the issue of same-sex marriage raised the question
of whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause might extend beyond divorce
to other familial statuses. By way of background, in 1993 the Supreme
Court of Hawaii suggested that its state constitution might require the
legalization of same-sex marriage,386 and this decision quickly led to a
See supra Part III.A.
See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 29 (quoting the Massachusetts statute).
384 See supra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
386 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In that case, the court ruled that,
382
383

although there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii
Constitution “sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal protection analysis.” Id. at
67. For that reason, the court held that the state’s discriminatory definition of marriage
was presumptively unconstitutional, and the state could only rebut that presumption by
a showing that “(a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state
interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights.” Id.
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nationwide panic.387 The concern was that such an action—analogous to
Nevada’s legalization of “quickie divorces”—would in essence legalize
same-sex marriage throughout the United States as Americans would
travel to Hawaii to wed their same-sex partners and then return home,
demanding that their state recognize the union.388 In response, a large
number of states took preemptive action and adopted constitutional
amendments proclaiming that they would only recognize marriages
between one man and one woman.389 As public pressure grew, the federal
government also get involved, passing The Defense of Marriage Act in
1996.390 The act declared, in part, that no state would be required to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.391
As the debate over same-sex marriage raged on, the question
emerged as to whether a state could, consistent with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed
in other states. The conventional wisdom was that they could indeed
refuse such recognition. Basically, it had long been assumed that full
faith and credit applied only to state judgments and not state laws, with
marriage—unlike divorces which are clearly judgments—falling more
into the latter category.392 As Steve Sanders explains, “[m]arriage,
387 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The
Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015) ([W]hen the Hawaii Supreme

Court shocked the nation in 1993 and ruled in favor of Nina Baehr's petition to marry
her female partner in Baehr v. Lewin, the issue of same-sex marriage drew prominent
national attention.”); David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and
Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 526 (1999) (noting
how the Hawaii opinion “stirred by far the most attention, for it led to the first appellate
decision in the United States suggesting that same-sex couples were constitutionally
entitled to marry and produced a seismic political reaction in Hawaii and the mainland”).
388 See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-the Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2003) (“[T]he combination of national citizenship (as
enforced by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing
marriages validly celebrated in another state, meant that . . . there was a fear . . . that
all other states would have to recognize same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.”).
389 See William Buss & Emily Buss, Escaping the American Blot? A Comparative
Look at Federalism in Australia and the United States Through the Lens of Family Law,
48 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 105, 133 n.151 (2015) (“Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme
Court's ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex
marriage to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as
constitutional amendments.”).
390 See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
391 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State.”).
392 See Rebecca Aviel, Faithful Unions, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 721, 728-34 (2018)
(outlining the “conventional wisdom” of why the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
inapplicable when it comes to “interstate marriage conflicts”).
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according to this conventional wisdom, is simply another subject for
ordinary lawmaking—no different from things like workers'
compensation, insurance regulation, gas royalties, or fishing licenseswhere each state gets to decide policy for itself.”393 As such, most scholars
were fairly confident that rules regarding choice of law, and not the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, would provide the proper guide for answering
questions regarding marriage recognition.394
However, during oral arguments for Obergefell v. Hodges395—the
case that would ultimately make marriage equality a reality—something
interesting happened: the justices seemed quite critical of the idea that
marriage recognition fell outside the dictates of full faith and credit. For
instance, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that “there’s nothing in the
Constitution that requires a state to recognize a marriage from a sister
state.”396 Justice Ginsburg likewise remarked that “it is odd, isn’t it, that
a divorce does become the decree for the nation . . . but not the act of
marriage.”397 Despite the intriguing nature of this line of questioning
and what it all might portend for the intersection of marriage and full
faith and credit going forward, oral argument marked the full extent to
which the Court would address the issue. When Kennedy’s opinion was
released in June of 2015, it did not even mention the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Of course, given the nature of the Court’s holding, it was
unnecessary: “The Court . . . holds same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that . . . there is no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”398
Nonetheless, the questions raised by the Court have given further life
to an excellent point raised by Joanna Grossman: “[t]he fact that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has not been invoked in the marriage context
does not mean that it could not be.”399 Indeed, a number of scholars have
argued that it is applicable for a variety of reasons.400 For example, some
393 Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still "Irrelevant" to Same-Sex
Marriage?: Toward A Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95, 96

(2014)

394 See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional
Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2222 n.18 (2005) (“As conflicts scholars must

explain with increasing frequency, the decision by one state to give effect to a marriage
performed in another state is a matter of comity, not constitutional or federal mandate.”).
395 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
396 See Aviel, supra note 392, at 735 (internal quotations omitted). Aviel further
points out that, when counsel answered that Scalia’s statement was “essentially correct,”
Scalia responded by saying “Really?” Id.
397 Id. at 740.
398 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 681.
399 Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of NonUniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 454 (2005).
400 See, e.g., Aviel, supra note 392, at 721 (arguing in favor of a “interstate recognition
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have pointed out that merely leaving marriage to a choice of law analysis
is problematic given such “analysis inherently favors state interests over
individual rights,”401 and marriage is increasingly seen as an individual
right—one subject to constitutional protection.
Further, as a
constitutional right, some national uniformity is required if American
law is to avoid the situation in which individuals’ federal constitutional
rights vary depending upon the state in which they currently reside.402
Finally, the reason for affording divorce differing analysis under full faith
and credit because it is a “judgment” is increasingly seen as “a matter of
formalism rather than a principled distinction based on the Clause’s
meaning and purposes.”403
Regardless of how that issue is ultimately resolved, the point here is
that the migratory divorce era is instructive in informing that future
debate. Specifically, when it comes to the role that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause plays not only in the realm of marriage recognition, but
other state law determinations regarding family, the migratory divorce
cases provide a rich resource for understanding the contours of that
constitutional provision as well as the degree to which it intersects with
family law, which as discussed above has increasingly taken on an a more
individual rights focus.404

D. Achieving Uniformity in the Face of State Sovereignty
Beyond serving as a catalyst for more liberal divorce laws nationwide,
one of the most positive legacies of migratory divorce is the creation of
the Uniform Law Commission.405 As detailed earlier, state concerns over
scheme with constitutional parameters”); Sanders, supra note 393, at 97 (arguing “that
a good argument can (and should) be made for applying full faith and credit to marriage”)
(emphasis omitted).
401 Sanders, supra note 393, at 110 (quoting Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional
Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 57 (1998)). As Sanders
points out, “[m]arriage and family life were once understood as matters of localism and
strict government control, but today they are predominantly understood in terms of
private ordering, autonomy, and individual rights.” Id.
402 Id. at 110-11 (asking “why is it rational to have two contradictory marriagerecognition regimes in the same country, forcing same-sex couples to live as married for
the purpose of one state's law but unmarried for the purpose of another state's law”); see
also Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to
Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 372 (1998) (“If the United States
is to be more than a loose federation of independent sovereignties, however, states do not
and cannot stand in the same relation to each other as they do to foreign countries.”).
403 Sanders, supra note 393, at 112 (pointing out that “[t]he doctrine of full faith and
credit for divorce was established before the rise of no-fault divorce, when marriage
dissolution necessarily involved some allegation of fault and thus adversarial litigation”).
404 See supra Part IV.A.
405 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 77, at 567 (“Alarmed by the prevalence of
disgruntled spouses taking wing for more legally hospitable habitats, New York initiated
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migratory divorce coupled with the realization that a constitutional
amendment was unlikely, lead to the establishment of this body.406 The
hope was that the National Conference might be able to produce a model
statute regarding divorce jurisdiction and recognition—one that a critical
mass of states might adopt so as to curtail an individual’s ability to obtain
a migratory divorce as well as the resulting advantage of doing so. In the
end, uniformity would come not from any model statute but the nation’s
demand for greater access to divorce, a demand that led to the eventual
adoption of no-fault divorce in all fifty states. Nonetheless, two
important lessons regarding uniform laws can be gleaned from that
history.
First, it became clear that where there is widespread
disagreement between the states regarding either the existence of a
problem or how that problem should best be addressed,407 uniform laws
are unlikely to be effective.
Second, and most relevant here is the obverse point—when states do
agree on the underlying policy goals, uniform laws can offer considerable
success when it comes to the law of domestic relations, helping states
realize societal benefits that would have otherwise been impossible. Two
of the most notable successes in that regard are the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA)408 and the Uniform Child-Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).409 The UIFSA, which was
promulgated in 1992, has been adopted in every state and has done much
to overcome the jurisdictional hurdles that once thwarted efforts at
collecting child support.410 At one point, parents encountered
considerable difficulties obtaining and enforcing child support orders
when their state lacked jurisdiction over the other parent.411 The UIFSA
addressed that problem by creating a two-state proceeding whereby a
parent seeking child support would file the action in her jurisdiction and
that court would then transfer the action to one that does have
jurisdiction over the other parent.412 As a result, the UIFSA has been
credited with “successfully effect[ing] major changes to child support
enforcement and recognition throughout the United States.”413
the creation of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.”).
406 See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
407 See supra Part III.B.
408 See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (1992) § 205, 9B U.L.A. 477 (2005).
409 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 682 (1999).
410 See Joseph W. Booth, A Guide for Assisting Military Families with the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 43 FAM. L.Q. 203, 215 (2009) (“Because every
state has used UIFSA since 1998, multiple orders are rare.”).
411 See Laura W. Morgan, Pre-Emption or Abdication? Courts Rule Federal Law
Trumps State Law in Child Support Jurisdiction, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 217
(2011) (describing the shortcomings of the legal landscape that predated the UIFSA).
412 See supra note 408, at § 203.
413 Eric M. Fish, The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) 2008:
Enforcing International Obligations Through Cooperative Federalism, 24 J. AM. ACAD.
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Whereas the UIFSA was directed at child support, the UCCJEA
targets child custody. Prior to the UCCJEA, which was promulgated in
1997,414 “any state with a substantial interest in the child’s welfare might
take jurisdiction of a custody case.”415
As a result, custody
determinations regarding a single child could be spread out over multiple
jurisdictions, often leading to conflicting decrees.416 In addition, parents
who were unhappy with one state’s determination could “seize and
run,”417 taking the child to another state in hopes of receiving a more
favorable decree. The UCCJEA, which has been adopted in every state
but Massachusetts, remedied these problems by establishing a hierarchy
of various bases for jurisdiction418 and, with limited exceptions, provides
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to the state that made the initial
custody determination.419 As a result, the UCCJEA is today considered
“one of the more successful uniform acts concerning jurisdictional
allocation.”420
The UCCJEA and the UIFSA are but two of the uniform codes
promulgated by the National Conference. Others include the Uniform
Parentage Act (2002);421 the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act (2012);422 the Uniform Representation of Children in
MATRIM. LAW. 33 (2011)
414 Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to
Protect Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 130 (2004).
415 ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 940 (2019).
416 See Barry B. McGough, Elinor H. Hitt & Katherine C. McGuire, Domestic
Relations, 68 MERCER L. REV. 107, 109 (2016) (noting how “[t]he UCCJEA was
promulgated to address problems of competing jurisdictions entering conflicting
interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and the drawn out and complex child
custody legal proceedings often encountered by parties [when] multiple states are
involved”) (internal quotes omitted).
417 Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC's of the UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice
Under the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267, 283 (1998).
418 See Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2036 n. 45 (2014) (“The UCCJEA [puts] the various jurisdictional bases in a
hierarchy, rather than treating them as equally available alternatives from which a court
could select one or another at its own discretion.”).
419 Kevin Wessel, Home Is Where the Court Is: Determining Residence for Child
Custody Matters Under the UCCJEA, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2012) (noting how
this feature of the UCCJEA helps prevent forum shopping).
420 Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J.
COMPLEX LITIG. 51, 84 (2012); see also Amy C. Gromek, Military Child Custody Disputes:

The Need for Federal Encouragement for the States' Adoption of the Uniform Deployed
Parents Custody and Visitation Act, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 873, 901 (2014) (“[D]espite
minor linguistic variations in the states' versions, the UCCJEA still has been successful
at achieving a high level of uniformity.”).
421 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 311 (2002).
422 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2, 9C U.L.A. 15 (Supp.
2014).
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Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act (2007);423 and the Uniform
Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act
(2002).424 Although each has enjoyed varying degrees of success in terms
of how widely they have been adopted, there can be no doubt that uniform
laws allow for solutions that might otherwise be impossible in the face of
state sovereignty. Given that unique utility, there is no doubt that the
National Conference will continue to improve upon existing proposals as
well as propose new uniform laws so as to offer solutions better tailored
to the evolving nature of the American family and the growing
understanding of the legal issues arising from those changes. For
instances, J. Thomas Oldham has proposed a “Uniform Equitable
Distribution Jurisdiction Act” to deal with the degree to which divisible
divorce promotes forum shopping.425 Similarly, James Dwyer has
proposed uniform laws dealing with such issues as “Family Formation”
and “Children’s Relationships with Nonparents,” among others.426
As the National Conference continues its work and as family law
scholars continue to uncover additional areas in which uniform laws
would be particularly effective, the lessons of the migratory divorce era
are uniquely instructive. Specifically, it bears remembrance that, first,
it was migratory divorce that prompted states to even create and explore
this potential solution to such problems.427 Second, in studying this
history, there are a number of lessons to be learned in reviewing the
proposals directed at ending migratory divorce, why those attempts
ultimately failed, and how to avoid those failures going forward.428
V. CONCLUSION
When contemporary legal scholars today reference the period of
migratory divorce, they have often described it as “little more than a
historical curiosity.”429 And, as detailed above, it does indeed represent
a fascinating time in American legal history—one that spanned at least
a hundred years,430 was responsible for numerous Supreme Court
423 See UNIF. REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 26 (2007).
424 See UNIF. INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS
ACT, 9 U.L.A. 28 (2005).
425 See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Why a New Uniform Equitable Distribution
Jurisdiction Act is Needed to Reduce Forum Shopping in Divorce Litigation, 49 Fam. L.
Q. 359 (2015).
426 See JAMES G. DWYER, The Relationship Right of Children 253-290 (2006).
427 See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
428 See supra Part III.B.
429 See Parnian Toofanian, Three's a Crowd - Sherrer v. Sherrer, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 185, 191 (2004); see also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
430 See supra Part II.B.
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decisions,431 and was a frequent topic of books, movies, and novels of the
time.432 However, the phenomenon of migratory divorce represents so
much more. As the United States considered how best to address the
societal forces that incentivized countless Americans to leave their homes
for months on end simply to try and escape a broken marriage, a number
of themes came to the foreground—themes that were instrumental in
forming the foundation of the nation’s evolving understanding of the law
of domestic relations.433 Thus, keeping in mind the words of Earl Warren,
who once remarked that “[a]ll lawyers are . . . in some sense students of
legal history,”434 it is the position of this Article that migratory divorce is
not simply a historical oddity but instead remains an essential resource
for scholars, courts and policy makers alike as they continue to grapple
with the evolving problems facing contemporary family law.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
433 See supra Part IV.
434 Earl Warren, Introduction, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1957).
431
432
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